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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine the preferences of clients of programs
administered by selected federal agencies and the preferences of the federal managers who
administer the programs in assessing performance measurement systems. Using the general
progression of previous budgetary models used in the public sector, the researcher developed the
Modified Balance Scorecard (MBSC), a performance measurement model designed specifically
for use within the public sector.
Surveys based on the MBSC were administered to public managers and to clients of those
managers in order to determine their preferences. The results showed that managers preferred
public good measures and clients preferred financial measures. Both groups’ second preferred
index of measures was internal management process measures.
This research is important in policy formulation and provides many implications
regarding the effective presentation of policies. These results can be used to help craft policies
for maximum effectiveness, based on the preferences of the respective groups.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the preferences of clients of programs
administered by selected federal agencies and the preferences of the federal managers who
administer the programs in assessing performance measurement systems. Using the general
progression of previous budgetary models used in the public sector, the researcher developed the
Modified Balance Scorecard (MBSC), a performance measurement model designed specifically
for use within the public sector. The MBSC is a combination of elements of previous budgetary
models that uses five various measurement perspectives to assess the overall performance of
entire systems, whether individual programs or entire organizations. These perspectives include
the financial perspective, the client perspective, the employee perspective, the internal
management process perspective, and the public good perspective.
In the present research, the preferences of the clients and the managers were measured
using two separate survey instruments, one designed specifically for the assessment of the
clients’ preferences and one designed for the assessment of the managers’ preferences. The
results of this research are important in policy formulation and provide many implications
regarding the effective presentation of policies. These results can be used to help effectively craft
policies so that these policies can be presented to various groups, based on the preferences of the
particular group to which the policy is being presented.
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This dissertation sought to answer the following research questions: What measures
should be included in the MBSC model? What are the stakeholders’ preferences for the
measures? What determines the preferences for the measures?
The research was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, existing literature was
examined and synthesized to develop a comprehensive performance evaluation model. The
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model was used as the general framework for the development of this
comprehensive model as it integrates both financial and non-financial measures. The resulting
model reflects a comprehensive approach to assessing the effectiveness of programs
administered by federal government agencies in an accurate and valid way.
The preferences of federal managers and their clients were measured through two
separate questionnaires. The first survey was administered to federal business clients as a
convenience survey at the 15th Annual Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
(OSDBU) Procurement Conference, which was held on April 21, 2005, at The Show Place
Arena in Upper Marlboro, MD. The second was administered by mail to managers from the 66
federal agencies. Data generated from the results of the surveys were used to analyze the
preferences of federal program managers and federally program clients.
Prior to the development of the BSC, there were several competing major measurement
models. These models are examined in the literature review. This dissertation proposed an
additional, more developed, and further refined model that can be used for the effective
assessment of programs administered by federal government agencies. However, the main
purpose of this dissertation was to determine the preferences of federal managers and federal
program clients in performance measurement systems.
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This dissertation contributes to the existing body of knowledge in several ways. First, it
adds to the literature by incorporating a major aspect of performance measurement within the
federal arena that has not previously been formally used within any budgetary assessment
model—the public good. The public good is what basically separates the modified balanced
scorecard model apart from the BSC. Some previous budgetary models have typically focused on
the evaluation of resources consumed for services or production, while others have addressed
organizational outputs or outcomes. In this dissertation a comprehensive measurement model
was developed to evaluate all major aspects of an organization’s operations—including both
organizational outputs and organizational outcomes. The interrelationships among the different
measures were examined and the model was used to quantify the preferences of the respondents.
In commercial entities, performance measurement is clearly reflected by the entities’
profitability. However, it is much more difficult to measure performance when it falls under the
general guise of public entities. This dissertation identifies an appropriate measurement system
that captures the essence of the important measures in governmental and other non-profit entities.
Second, this dissertation identifies the performance measurement preferences of both the
clients of federal programs and the managers that administer these federal programs.
Additionally, various possible determinants of those performance measurement preferences were
examined. These results can then be used to analyze and present policies so as to reflect these
stakeholder groups’ specific preferences for organizational performance. Though there are other
groups found within the model (e.g., employees), only clients and managers were considered for
this study. The results of this research should be useful in the area of policymaking and analysis,
more specifically within the formulation and presentation of organizational performance
assessment policies.
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Third, this dissertation builds on a body of knowledge regarding the empirical evaluation
of the performance measurement preferences of managers and clients. Additionally, bodies of
knowledge can be initiated regarding the preferences of the other groups found within the
MBSC. Through further evaluation and ancillary empirical research, the preferences of each of
the various stakeholder groups can be empirically assessed so that policies can be crafted to best
satisfy the preferences of each group as the policy is being presented to that specific groups.
Accordingly, if the policy is presented to a group, based on the preferences of that group, then
the likelihood of that group accepting the policy should increase.
Throughout this dissertation, the OSDBU was used for illustrative purposes. The primary
purpose of the OSDBU is to promote the utilization of small, disadvantaged, and women-owned
businesses by federal governmental agencies. Though the utilization of small businesses is
encouraged throughout all federal agencies, the OSDBU was established for the specific purpose
of helping the federal government reach its small business goals. The OSDBU accomplishes this
by using various programs designed to assist the small business owner in preparing to conduct
business with the federal government via contracting. More specifically, this office assists these
firms in obtaining contracts and subcontracts with agencies such as NASA and prime contractors
that conduct business with these federal agencies by helping these entrepreneurs hone their skills
and make themselves as marketable as possible to these federal agencies and their prime
contractors.
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter I introduced the basic research
questions and the other underlying issues. Chapter II provides a review of the history and
relevant literature regarding various models of measurement. Chapter III presents the Modified
Balance Score Card model and elaborates on the significance of the contribution made by this
4

dissertation. Chapter IV outlines the methodology for conducting both phases of this research.
Chapter V presents the results of the client survey. Chapter VI presents the findings of the
manager survey. Chapter VII presents and discusses the findings and conclusions from both sets
of participants. Additionally, the policy implications and recommendations of these findings are
explored in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature related to developing the
measurement model used in this dissertation. In this chapter, the commonly used terminology
regarding the measurement of performance within organizations is presented. The literature for
previous measurement models is examined and reviewed. Finally, the literature is summarized,
including an examination of the shortcomings of previous measurement models.

Definitions of Measures
Various measures have been used to assess operational efficiency and effectiveness. In a
commonly-accepted typology derived from the open-system theory (Easton, 1979; Katz & Kahn,
1966; Thompson, 1967), performance measures (PM) can be grouped into the three basic
categories of input, output, and outcome measures (Greytak, Phares, & Morley, 1976). Input
measures are used to assess the resources that governments consume in producing a service or
(less often) a product. This is why inputs are considered to be the building blocks for efficiency
measures. These measures are easy to define and often readily available (Tigue & Strachota,
1994). On the other hand, inputs fail to indicate levels of services or achievement. This is why
most studies of performance measures in local service delivery do not count inputs as
performance measures. Examples of classification of inputs by purchase type include personnel,
supplies, equipment, utilities, and contractual services.
6

Output is a measure of “the amount of a product produced, service rendered, or work
done, without consideration as to the quality or desirability of what has been done” (Greytak et.
al., 1976, p. 17). Outputs are sometimes referred to as “workload” measures (Ammons, 2002)
and occasionally are used to measure productivity (Morley, 1986). Continuing to use the
OSDBU for illustrative purposes, an example of an output would be the number of clients
receiving agency services. Several studies connect output of a service with the cost incurred by
the service to measure the efficiency of this service delivery (Greytak et. al., 1976; Hatry, 1979;
Millar, Hatry, & Koss, 1977; Morley, Vinson, & Hatry, 2001; Rossi & Freeman, 1989; Wholey
& Hatry, 1992, 2004).
Outcome measures address the achievements or consequences of supplying public
services to targeted recipients (Greytak et. al., 1976; Wholey, Hatry, Newcomer, & Manion,
1997). Outcomes are sometimes referred to as “impact” in the literature of program evaluation
(Rossi & Freeman, 1989). Some authors prefer to use “outcome” as the short-term result of a
program and “impact” as the long-term result (Levy, Meltsner, & Wildavsky, 1974). Within the
OSDBU, an outcome measure is the assessment of the quality of service supplied, while an
output measure is the quantity of service supplied (Tigue & Strachota, 1994). Within the
OSDBU, an example of an outcome would be the number of clients who, after attending their
training program, successfully secured federal contracts or subcontracts.

Use of Measures in the Public Sector: A Review of Budgeting Literature
Performance measurement has been discussed in the context of the strategic planning
process, the budgeting process, human resource management, and many other organizational
processes. This study reviewed the literature of performance measurement examined in the
7

public budgetary process because performance measures have been widely used in the budgeting
process within the public sector. Though a variety of measures have been developed and
implemented to assist budgetary decision-making process, truly adequate systems remain
evasive. This situation occurs largely because performance measurement systems are situational
in nature, as opposed to being universal, and they are socially constructed, as opposed to being
technically constructed (Johnston, 2005). In one case study, environmental factors related to
demand was shown to be the strongest single determinant of performance (Fernandes, Mills &
Fleury (2005). Nevertheless, the literature about the use of performance measurement in the
public budgeting process is rich and growing, providing a solid theoretical foundation that is
needed for the formulation of the Modified Balance Score Card (MBSC) model used in this
study. Studies have been conducted to evaluate the budget cycles process (Bouckaert & Peters,
2002; Broom, 1995; Joyce, 1993; Martin, 2000; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001; Mercer, 2002;
Voytek, Lellock, & Schmit, 2004; Walker, 2002; Wang, 2000). This dissertation focuses on the
measurement literature of six major budgeting models, with the MBSC model evolving through
the integration of the existing literature. That is, the existing body of knowledge was examined
and integrated, thereby resulting in the evolution of a new model which became the MBSC.
Every budget system comprises the purposes and functions of planning, management,
and control (Schick, 1994). Planning involves the determination of objectives, the evaluation of
alternative courses of action, and the authorization of select programs. Planning is most closely
linked to budget preparation. Management involves the programming of approved goals into
specific projects and activities, the design of organizational units to carry out approved
programs, and the staffing of these units and the procurement of necessary resources to
operationalize the plans. The management process is spread over the entire budget cycle. It
8

should be the link between goals established and activities undertaken. Control refers to the
process of binding operating officials to the policies and plans set by their superiors. Control is
predominant during the execution and audit stages.
Public budgeting is especially complex and has been evaluated on four dimensions (Hyde
& Shafritz, 1978). First, as a political instrument, public budgeting is used to determine the most
appropriate allocation of scarce public resources among various social and economic needs.
Second, as a managerial or administrative instrument, public budgeting specifies the ways and
means of providing public programs and services. Additionally, it establishes the costs and
criteria by which activities are evaluated for efficiency and effectiveness. Third, as an economic
instrument, public budgeting can direct a nation’s or state’s economic growth and development,
since it is a tool used to redistribute income, stimulate growth, promote full employment, combat
inflation, and maintain economic stability. Finally, as an accounting instrument, public budgeting
is used as a means of holding governmental officials, and governments in the aggregate,
responsible for the expenditure of the funds with which they have been entrusted.
Cozetto, Kweit, and Kweit (1995) identified five major budgetary decision-making
approaches that have been adopted throughout the history of budgeting in the United States.
These five approaches are line-item budgeting, performance budgeting, planning and
programming budgeting (PPB), zero-based budgeting (ZBB), and outcome-based or target based
budgeting (also known as New Performance Budgets or NPB). In addition to reviewing these
five approaches to public budgeting, the researcher evaluated the Balanced Scorecard (BSC).
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Line-Item Budgetary Model
The line-item budget is the most basic and traditional type of budget format (Cozzetto et
al., 1995). Also known as the object-of-expenditure classification (Mikesell, 1999), this type of
budget is appropriately named because each item of each program is listed along with the
associated expenditure (Cozzetto et al, 1995.). Line-item budgeting was initiated during the early
part of the 20th century and was one of the first types of budgeting systems introduced into
government. It has been used extensively at all levels of government, as well as in the private
sector. The standard of budgeting in the public sector has long been the traditional line-item
budget (Moylan, 1995). This format serves as the basic structure for budget development in that
it has become the template that many agencies use for estimating the cost of carrying out plans
for service. Most other budget classifications begin from some type of line-item basis (Mikesell,
1999). It is the building block for budget cost estimates, after it has been determined what the
agency wants to do, and provides the focus for the control structures of government operation
(Lynch, 1995).
The measurement focus of line-item budgets is on inputs to the flow of service provision
(Mikesell, 1999; Moylan, 1995). Its purpose is to identify the cost of specific materials and
services. Usually little descriptive information justifying the expenditures is provided. In other
words, the focus is on the resources (i.e., labor, equipment, supplies) that the government
purchases, whether directly from its suppliers or indirectly through transfer-subsidy-loan
programs.
In a line-item budget, particular components of an organization are identified, and a
particular allocation of money is specified, with no connection to the program or the expected
outcomes produced by an organization (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). The emphasis is on purchase
10

type, such as personnel, office supplies and equipment, utilities, or contractual services.
According to Cozzetto et al.(1995), line-item budgets were initially used because the role of the
budget was to control and account for expenditures of public monies. The line-item budget was
developed in response to a government reform movement to stop, or at least control, fraud and
abuse in government spending (Lynch, 1995; Martin, 2000).
The strength of input measures, which are emphasized in line-item budgeting, is that they
provide a detailed classification of the scope and level of resource consumption for legislative
review and managerial decision-making. In addition, line-item measures can be used as the basis
for many other types of performance measures such as the creation of efficiency measures that
are adopted in many subsequent measurement models. By nature, input measures are simplistic,
making them easy to understand, develop, and use. For example, some of the particular strengths
of line-item budgets are that they allow for easy comparisons between previous year and current
year expenditures, they are easily understood by the layperson, and they allow for a high degree
of control over expenditures (Cozzetto et. al., 1995).
One of the major weaknesses of input measures is that they do not consider subsequent
actions such as goals achieved, outcomes attained, or output produced (Cozzetto et. al., 1995).
These measures simply explain the various categories where resources have been consumed in
the production of services. Another weakness is that they provide little in the way of long-term
planning. Additionally, they do not address the rationale for the allocation of resources to any
specific program. Furthermore, line-item budgets provide little narrative to tie expenditures to
performance criteria. Finally, it has been pointed out that line-item budgeting has no direct
relationship to the cost of the utility provided by the program, nor does it reflect program goals
(Moylan, 1995). For example, if the OSDBU used some form of line-item budgeting system, the
11

expenditures reflected in these categories would be organized or categorized by expenditure
type, such as office supplies, rent, office hardware, furniture, and so on.

Performance-Based Budgetary Models
The concept of performance budget was introduced at the federal government level in
1949 by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, also known
as the “Hoover Commission” (Mikesell, 1999; Posner, 1997; Seckler-Hudson, 1978). One of this
commission’s major recommendations was for the federal government to replace the line-item
budget format with the performance budget (Cozzetto et. al., 1995), which is prepared on the
basis of the functions and objectives of governmental agencies and departments, rather than
exclusively on the basis of objects of expenditure and organizational units (Seckler-Hudson,
1978).
As opposed to the inputs reflected in line-item budgets, performance budgets emphasize
agency-activity performance objectives and accomplishments (Cozzetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell,
1999). These budgets were initiated as a means of shifting the focus away from the inputs of
government and towards the functions, activities, costs, and accomplishments of government
(Posner, 1997). In other words, the focus was accomplishments, ends, outputs, or planned
agency-activity performance objectives (Mikesell; Moylan, 1995; Seckler-Hudson, 1978). This
focus on the use of output and activity measures in performance budgeting serves the dual
purpose of allowing elected officials to define policy objectives and designing budgets to
accomplish those objectives rather than focusing on allocating resources at the agency level
(Cozetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell, 1999). This particular type of performance model relates groups
of expenditures or “activity classifications” to a larger mission (Cozzetto et. al., 1995), such as
12

consumer output or contribution to public objectives. Therefore, in the performance budget, the
single most important task is the precise definition of the work to be done and a careful
estimation of what that work will cost (Seckler-Hudson, 1978).
The essence of performance budgets is that the budget should be tied to programs in
order to provide an easier basis for policy-making (Emmerich & McLean, 1978; Mikesell, 1999).
One of the major characteristics of performance budgeting is that allocations of money are tied to
specific program outputs, which is consistent with the search for efficiency through maximizing
results from inputs (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). Mikesell (1999) indicated:
The performance classification promises better services at lower costs from more
accountable officials; improved legislative review as attention and debate shift away from
issues of personnel, salaries, supplier contracts, and the like, toward activity issues more
related to how resources are used; and centralized decision making, allowing top
management to concentrate its attention on policy matters. (p. 186)
In other words, performance budgets link costs with activities, and this linkage permits unit-cost
comparisons across agencies and over time within agencies, thereby representing changes,
whether improvements or declines, in operating efficiency.
The performance budget is intended to show the results of government spending and
thereby to relate past performance to future policy objectives (Emmerich & McLean, 1978).
Performance budgets also have some special, unique implications (Mikesell, 1999). For this type
of budget structure, the budgetary decision-making power should always be placed with the
central management agencies such as CEO offices for the development and implementation of
performance measurement design and performance control. Also, the process of performance
budgeting often involves a re-analysis of top functions and a reconsideration of the appropriation
process by the legislature (Emmerich & McLean, 1978).
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Cozzetto et al. (1995) discussed the strengths of performance budgets. First, performance
budgets facilitate more comprehensive decision-making, including allocation and performance
criteria. Second, performance budgets expedite the appropriations process, because the amount
of detailed cost information is reduced compared to the line-item approach. Third, these budgets
allow for internal managerial control over budget and performance guidelines as opposed to
control from a central agency. Finally, these budgets become important evaluation tools.
Due to these strengths, performance budgeting grew to become a key management tool
for the 1990s (Moylan, 1995). Nonetheless, there were differing perceptions across the branches
of government regarding the extent and the success of performance budget implementation
(Willoughby & Melkers, 1998). Though performance budgeting allowed for comparisons
between programs and within programs (e.g., comparison to the previous year’s performance), it
also enabled management to periodically review work processes so that inefficiencies could be
improved. Finally, it facilitated the challenge of “doing more with less.” Linking budgets to
performance gained momentum from calls to “reengineer” business and to “reinvent”
government in the early 1990s (Burke, Modarresi, & Serban, 1999).
In the 1980s and 1990s management saw different trends, such as management by
objectives (MBO) and Total Quality Management (TQM), which are models that emphasize
performance. These initiatives are in direct contrast to previous models, which emphasized
compliance. Thus, advocates of management by results tend to emphasize performance, while
advocates of control by regulation emphasize compliance, and all of these tendencies fueled the
performance budgeting trend.
Performance budgets have several major limitations. First, it is difficult to adequately
assess program outputs, thereby making the evaluation of overall program performance
14

problematic (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). This evaluation is more difficult for public agencies, which
cannot simply look at profit measures as commercial entities do. Second, the entire process is
very long and arduous because of the level of staff involvement and commitment (Moylan,
1995). There must be an accompanying reorganization of the administrative agencies to match
programs so that program costs can be translated to administrative-unit appropriations. Without
this alignment, the program budget format “yields numbers that are not usable by budget
decision-makers and choices will continue to be made in the familiar setting of the traditional
(line-item) budgets” (Mikesell, 1999, p. 186). As Mikesell pointed out, many agency managers
do not like performance budgets because the nature of this budgeting system exposes the agency
to increased scrutiny by external parties such as taxpayers and legislators. Additionally,
legislatures must change their review and appropriations procedures to a system that has no
apparent linkage to revenue and budget balancing, making it more difficult to measure and more
difficult to respond to the demands of citizens. Furthermore, performance budgets do not ask
whether the performance being measured is the service the public actually wants (Mikesell,
1999).
Once again, using the OSDBU as an example, instead of simply categorizing
expenditures by function, these expenditures would be categorized by goal achieved. For
example, if the goal were to serve 200 women-owned businesses in the state of Florida per fiscal
year, then the cost for serving these businesses would be calculated as a cost per business served.

Planning, Programming Budgetary Models
Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems (PPBS or PPB) represent another step on the
road towards budget reform. These types of measurement systems focus on the relationship of
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inputs to outputs and emphasize outcomes. Based on the premise that data are to be organized
around programs, the budget categories are compiled using a line-item system and the inputs are
allocated to particular programs, as opposed to line items within an entire agency. These systems
essentially combine the control orientation found in line-item budgets with the management
orientation found in performance budgets (Mikesell, 1999), resulting in the planning oriented
PPBS model.
Mandated across the federal government in 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson
(Posner, 1997), PPBS was seen as a means of improving major program decisions in operating
agencies (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1968). In general, different levels and types of performance
could be arrayed, quantified, and analyzed to make the best budgetary decisions. PPBS provides
for identification of program issues and consideration of such issues in the framework of a
program structure. Therefore, the main difference between Program Budgeting and PPBS is that
the former promotes managerial discretion and the development of performance indicators to
assist with program evaluation while the latter emphasizes long-term planning, the use of
sophisticated quantitative analysis to assist with resource allocation decisions, and
standardization of the process across federal agencies.
As stated by Wildavsky (1979), PPBS basically compares consequences horizontally
across all major programs. PPBS provides for identification of program issues and consideration
of such issues in the framework of a program structure. It requires a structure where all policies
related to common objectives are compared for cost and effectiveness. The system has three
basic elements: Program memoranda, Special Analytic Studies, and Program and Financial Plans
(Hyde & Shafritz, 1978). Program memoranda provide the documentation for the strategic
decisions recommended for the budget year. The special analytic studies provide the analytic
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groundwork for the decisions reflected in the program memoranda. Program and financial plans
provide a continuing record from year to year of the output, costs, and financing of all agency
programs.
Each branch of government has its own set of perceptions of PPBS. The various branches
perceive the extent that PPBS is being implemented differently, and they perceive the level of
success associated with implementation differently, as well (Willoughby & Melkers, 1998).
Analysis showed that states with better-known PPBS systems have not necessarily realized
greater success in terms of effectiveness from this type of budget reform than states with less
popularly known systems. By implementing a PPBS system, agencies will not necessarily see
actual changes in spending amounts. Most of the changes that will be experienced at the agency
due to the implementation of a PPBS system will be expressed in the way that the agency is
managed.
One of the major strengths of PPBS is that it ties expenditures to agency goals, which are
usually rooted in specific programs (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). A second strength is that it
incorporates useful quantitative tools. A third strength is that it relates expenditures to long-term
planning and provides a mechanism for accountability.
One of the major weaknesses of PPBS is that PPBS strategies successful for fund
allocation for the national defense may not be met with the similar level of success for civilian
programs due to the differences in goal-setting, decision-making, and service delivery structure
in these organizations. Another major weakness is that PPBS is extremely complex, making it
difficult to be effectively implemented. This difficulty arises because it creates a strong demand
for the technical capabilities of budgetary agencies and staff. Program budgets also require new
guidelines and extra effort by all involved parties (including legislatures, lobbyists, and
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government departments). Therefore, based on the researcher’s experience in management,
unless all parties actually want the new format and are willing to put the necessary time into
learning the new format, it will be ignored in favor of more traditional formats.
The sheer complexity of PPBS causes several other negative situations to arise. For one,
the proper use of PPBS requires specific training for budget analysts, often causing adequately
trained budget analysts to be in short supply. A second weakness is that it produces voluminous
amounts of data that can overwhelm the system. Furthermore, the complexity of this type of
budgeting system fosters budget games and financial mismanagement (Cozzetto et. al., 1995).
Finally, as stated by Wildavsky (1979), “Program budgeting has not succeeded anywhere in the
world it was tried. It has failed because its cognitive requirements—relating causes to
consequences in all important areas of policy—are beyond individual or collective human
capacity” (p. 179).
To continue with our example: If the OSDBU agency implemented a type of PPBS, all
budgeted expenditures would be distributed across the various programs within the agency. For
instance, all expenditures for salaries, supplies, and rent would be spread across the various
programs within the agency. The total cost for each program would then be tabulated so that the
total cost for each program could be calculated and distributed accordingly across the
expenditure categories.

Zero-Based Budgetary Models
Whereas program budgeting compares consequences and results across all major
programs (horizontally), zero-based budgeting compares consequences and results within each
program (vertically) by starting from scratch each year (Wildavsky, 1979). Former President
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Jimmy Carter implemented zero-base budgeting (ZBB) at the federal level during his presidency
(Mikesell, 1999; Posner, 1997). ZBB was designed as a holistic management package,
integrating planning, operational strategies, resource allocation, and evaluation at all
organizational levels. ZBB demands a re-justification of the entire budget submission from
ground zero each year, and each agency is required to defend its entire budget annually with no
presumption that the agency will receive at least its prior-year appropriation. Consequently, the
beginning point for each subsequent year is zero and each program requires analysis and
justification each year (Mikesell, 1999). The main focus of ZBB is optimizing accomplishments
or outcomes available at various alternative budgetary levels (Posner, 1997). Stated another way,
ZBB is a system that requires agencies to prioritize their entire budget each year (Mikesell,
1999). For example, an agency would project levels of outcome if funded at $2 million versus
being funded at $1 million.
This re-justification of the entire budget submission each year from ground zero is in
contrast to the systems that were presented thus far that emphasize incremental changes in
budgetary decisions. Incremental budgeting systems essentially respect the outcomes of previous
budgetary decisions and focus examination on the margin of change from year to year (Hyde &
Shafritz, 1978). Therefore, ZBB is first and foremost a refutation of the incremental nature of
budgeting processes.
ZBB focuses on the concept of funding priorities. These priorities should reflect a
concern about the projects or activities that governments do. These projects or activities should
be prioritized for agencies to make funding decisions (Hyde & Shafritz, 1978, p. 219). ZBB
involves five fundamental steps that are used in its application (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). The first
step is to prepare “decision units,” which are activity centers, either program-specific or agency19

wide, that fall under the direction of a manager. The second step is to analyze each decision unit
within a “decision package.” The third step is to rank decision packages. Fourth, operating
budgets must be developed based upon approved decision packages. Fifth, management must
evaluate and review the ongoing progress with respect to financial expenditures, as well as
program implementation.
ZBB is characterized by numerous strengths (Cozzetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell, 1999).
First, it is a management-oriented approach to budgeting that uses standard processes on a
system-wide basis. ZBB also presents alternative strategies and describes the effects of various
methods of implementation. Additionally, when using ZBB, existing and new programs receive
the same level of scrutiny, thereby preventing bias caused by program familiarity. Furthermore,
ZBB presents the various ramifications of increases and decreases in funding levels and
integrates short-term planning with long-term planning. Finally, ZBB facilitates identification of
duplication within the organization.
Despite the many strengths of ZBB, there are three major limitations that hindered its
widespread acceptance and use (Cozzetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell 1999). First, there is a demand
for the development of decision packages and the process can be very time-consuming. Second,
like PPBS, the original form of ZBB is too complex, making it difficult to manage the process
and data needed. Third, since there is no guarantee of program continuity, the technical
presentation of the ZBB makes it difficult for the legislature to accept and use it.
If the OSDBU were required to utilize a ZBB plan, each program and activity, and all
subsequent expenditures provided by the agency, would have to be justified each year if any
funds were to be allocated for that purpose. For example, suppose that OSDBU Agency had a
program that was established to help business owners write effective business plans and
20

proposals so that they could secure financing through loans, grants, and contracts. During the
first year, this program might receive a substantial amount of money to cover start-up and other
initial costs and operating expenses without the program’s being undercapitalized. Initially, there
might also be a high level of demand for these services. However, during the second year of the
program, funding might be cut significantly because this program may not be the priority of
legislative consideration for funding.

Outcome-Based Performance Budgetary Models
Outcome-based performance budgets, also known as new performance budgets (NPB),
emphasize program impacts and results in budgetary decision making (Rossi & Freemen, 1989),
reflecting the efforts to move budget processes from an input focus to a more results-oriented or
outcome-oriented focus (Joyce, 1993; Martin, 2000; Mercer 2002; Mikesell, 1999; Posner, 1997;
Walker, 2002). NPB essentially define all activities, direct and indirect, required by a program
for support, in addition to estimating activity costs.
NPB involves efforts to link resources to results and is viewed as a specific type of
analysis that focuses strictly on outcomes (Martin, 1997; Mercer, 2002; Walker, 2002). By
definition, NPB is an integrated annual performance plan and annual budget that shows the
relationship between program funding levels and expected results by identifying the relationships
between dollars and results, as well as explaining how those relationships are created (Mercer,
2002). NPB, therefore, presents a general indication of how dollars are expected to generate
results, which facilitates resource allocation decisions by suggesting the potential effect of
budget increases and decreases. This type of outcome-based assessment is especially useful in
the human-services–contracting arena. It is used to conduct program evaluations that attempt to
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determine or verify accountability by measuring and evaluating the end results of government
programs, rather than by monitoring inputs and processes (Dicke & Ott, 1999).
NPB is a valuable diagnostic tool for developing a fundamental understanding of the
integration between resources applied and performance achieved (Wang, 2002b). Once created, a
performance budget may become the foundation for building a comprehensive performance
management system that is a crucial part of the agency-wide overall strategic plan. A wellcrafted performance budget provides agency managers with a starting point for monitoring
organizational performance.
Social indicators have also been shown to play a role in this type of results-oriented
budget system (Aristigueta, Cooksy, & Nelson, 2001). Just as agency performance indicators
reflect the level of program outcomes experienced, social performance indicators allow
researchers to monitor the general well-being of society at large. Performance measures have
been shown to be better at measuring program activities and outputs than measuring outcomes,
which are much more difficult to measure (Berman, 2002). One disadvantage to using these
measures is that implementing an inadequate performance measurement system can provide a
false sense of security and accomplishment, subsequently leading to misdirected resources and
activities (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002).
The underlying process involved in NPB begins with agencies’ identifying the outputs
and outcomes that are to be produced by their programs (Mikesell, 1999). Based on these outputs
and outcomes, performance targets are set and budget requests are made. The agency heads are
then accountable for achieving those results without micromanagement of the inputs.
Martin (1997) sought to define outcome budgeting. He found outcome budgeting to be
different from such traditional budgeting systems as PPB and performance budgeting, because
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outcome budgeting involves a specific type of analysis that focuses strictly on outcomes. He
stated that outcome budgeting appeared “to be a logical response to the pace of change, the
desire for government managers and administrators to become more innovative and
entrepreneurial, the devolution of government decision-making and authority, and the demand
for more government accountability for results” (p. 112). Martin went on to say that the
implementation of outcome budgeting can be thought of as involving at least two major
decisions. The first decision is the selection of a basic approach. The second decision is the
selection of a level of analysis. Martin (1997) concluded by stating that while outcome budgeting
does bear “a resemblance to performance or functional budgeting, it is sufficiently different to
constitute a new species of budgeting system” (p. 123).
NPB differs from such traditional budgeting systems as PPBS, management by objectives
(MBO), and traditional performance budgeting in that it involves a specific type of analysis that
focuses on outcomes and effectiveness (Martin, 1997). This type of budgeting system appears to
be a direct result of today's dynamic and unpredictable environment. It allows government
managers and administrators to be more innovative and entrepreneurial in the way that they run
their agencies and programs. It also provides the necessary accountability, while allowing
enough flexibility for the appropriate devolution of decision-making and authority. NPB can
further be described as involving a special type of analysis, which can be classified as the
analysis of results, accomplishments, or impacts (Martin, 2000). The primary target audience for
NPB is external stakeholders, which include elected officials, citizens, advocacy groups, and
others.
NPB has also been described as an integrated annual performance plan and annual budget
that shows the relationship between program funding levels and expected results (Mercer, 2002).
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As an effective budgeting mechanism, NPB can be used to identify the relationships between
dollars and results, as well as to explain how those relationships are created. NPB can be used to
identify these relationships since NPB defines all activities, direct and indirect, required by a
program for support, in addition to estimating activity costs. For example, NPB can be used to
produce an estimation of how dollars are expected to generate results. In turn, this information
facilitates resource-allocation decisions by suggesting the potential effect of budget increases and
decreases. Additionally, performance budgeting is a valuable diagnostic tool for developing a
fundamental understanding of the integration between resources applied and performance
achieved.
One of the major strengths of NPB is that it can be used to help enhance the
government’s capacity to assess competing claims in the budget by arming budgetary decisionmakers with better information on the results of both individual programs as well as entire
portfolios of tools and programs addressing common performance outcomes (Walker, 2002). An
additional strength of NPB is that it provides an important tool for assessing how spending
changes affect results. NPB can also be used as the foundation for the structure of program
outputs and performance goals. NPB is also invaluable in facilitating increased communication
between managers and employees because it is a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up process
(Mercer, 2002).
Despite challenges, NPB is achievable at the federal level, particularly now that the
requisite management reforms emphasizing accountability are in place (Mercer, 2002). NPB is
an ongoing process that involves every manager within an agency, from an agency head to
individual managers of programs and organizations within an agency. This level of involvement
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should foster more understanding and acceptance of the system within the various ranks of
management.
Though widely accepted as a promising tool in facilitating the reforms sought within
today’s government, NPB has been criticized for its inability to bring about fundamental changes
in actual budget outcomes (Halachmi 1997; Joyce, 1993). Proponents of NPB cite its potential to
bring about basic change in the resource-allocation process by using performance measures as
the primary means of allocating government resources. Use of this type of system would require
a transformation of most current budget allocation processes, which are heavily focused on
inputs, to outcome-oriented systems, which primarily focus on expected results.
Another major limitation is that, by focusing on the results of specific programs,
stakeholders may lose sight of what the overall goals of their organizations should be, such as
increased quality of life, and focus on more short-term, measurable goals. Losing sight of overall
goals will cause stakeholders to shift the focus of their resource-allocation processes away from
inputs and towards expected results. Therefore programs that have a more long-term–oriented
focus might get shortchanged because of the amount of time that it would take to yield
measurable results. Correcting the situation so that programs with a long-term focus do not get
shortchanged would require a complete overhaul of the way resources are currently allocated
from an input focus to a results focus.
There are other limitations associated with NPB, as well. For one, most government
officials do not have enough experience to effectively utilize NPB (Cozzetto et. al., 1995,
p. 213). Second, outcome measures will be difficult to compare because no standard
measurements exist that will apply across various agencies. Third, there needs to be a strong
consensus among elected officials, legislative bodies, and the general public regarding agency
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objectives, which is often difficult. Fourth, most accounting systems used by the governmental
agencies will have to be modified so that the information that they provide can be linked to
outcomes, which is difficult to accomplish within a short period of time and without sufficient
investment in technology. Fifth, many outcomes realized by agencies are largely out of their own
control, making outcomes all the more difficult to measure. Sixth, legislatures cannot
micromanage agencies and therefore cannot control the agencies’ outcomes (and
micromanagement usually proves to be a problem). Seventh, audits cannot focus solely on
financial measures. Obviously there are many limitations that must be considered when
examining NPB.
If the OSDBU agency were to categorize its expenditures using a type of new
performance budget, an example would be the number of small business–awarded prime
contracts with a specified government agency charged to each organizational funding source.
Another example is the amount of accounting costs that should be charged to each funding
source. The outcomes can be measured as the number of woman-owned businesses that
successfully submitted proposals to federal agencies and were awarded contracts as a direct
result of the assistance that they received from the OSDBU Agency. Another way the OSDBU
Agency could measure outcomes is by the number of businesses that received Small Business
Association (SBA) loans as a result of their assistance.

The Balanced Scorecard Model
In 1990, the Nolan Norton Institute, the research division of KPMG, sponsored a oneyear multi-company study on the future of performance measurement (Kaplan & Norton, 1992).
David Norton, CEO of Nolan Norton, was the study leader, and Professor Robert S. Kaplan of
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the Harvard Business School served as an academic consultant. The dozen companies that
formed the original study group believed that exclusive reliance on financial performance
metrics was causing their companies to do the wrong things. This study explored new methods of
performance measurement.
Kaplan, Norton, and the representatives from the participating companies met bimonthly
throughout 1990 to develop a new performance-measurement model. They began by analyzing
case studies involving innovative performance-measurement systems. The ideas investigated
included shareholder value, productivity and quality measurements, new compensation plans,
and a “Corporate Scorecard” (Kaplan & Norton, 1996a, p. 119). This group decided that the
scorecard was the most promising system and was therefore the most worthy of further
investigation, including refining the model.
The resulting Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model (see Figure 1) has been labeled one of the
75 most influential ideas of the 20th century, according to Harvard Business Review (Niven,
2002), and one that received much acclaim in the relevant literature (Hepworth, 1998). The
model was made up of four perspectives—financial, customer, internal processes, and innovation
and learning. BSC was significantly different from any existing performance-measurement
system and therefore generated considerable excitement in the performance-measurement world.
The unique quality of this model is the fact that this model struck a “balance” between leading
and lagging indicators, short- and long-term objectives, and external and internal performance
perspectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1992).
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Figure 1. The Balanced Scorecard Model

In 1992, Kaplan and Norton introduced the Balanced Scorecard. Known by the authors as
the “strategy scorecard,” it is a management tool used to develop performance measurement
standards in organizations. It provides executives with a comprehensive framework that
translates a company’s vision and strategy into a strategy-driven set of performance measures
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996c; Neely et. al., 2000). BSC basically is a method for translating an
organization’s mission and strategy into a condensed set of performance measures (Helfrich &
Filip, 2000; Maholland & Muetz, 2002). Therefore, the BSC was developed to be a holistic
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strategic management system that wires every part of the organization to its strategy scorecard.
BSC serves as a holistic model of strategy that allows employees to see how they are
contributing to organizational success (Kanji & Moura, 2001).
Following the development of the BSC model, Kaplan and Norton revised and improved
the model as they observed it being used in practical situations. The evolution from being strictly
a performance measurement tool to a strategic management system can be chronicled through
subsequent Kaplan and Norton articles and books (Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1993,
1996a, 1996c, 1996d, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2004c). This development is explored more
thoroughly in Chapter III.
Further work with senior business executives led to experiences with the BSC that
demonstrated that metrics spread across the four perspectives could effectively drive a single
strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 1996d). Kaplan and Norton based this concept of four perspectives
feeding from the overall organizational strategy and vision on the premise that the BSC could be
used as the foundation for core managerial processes such as resource allocation, budgeting,
planning, goal setting, and employee learning.
Traditionally, most managers have exclusively focused their attention on financial
measures, with managers in the manufacturing sector being one extreme example (Gosselin,
2005). Conversely, the BSC is based on the premise that an exclusive reliance on financial
measures in a management system is insufficient (Kaplan & Norton, 2001b) and that managers
should aim to strike a balance between both financial and non-financial measures. Touted as
being as useful as the more traditional framework of income statement, balance sheet, and
statement of cash flows for financial planning and reporting (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), the BSC
model was designed to bridge the missing gap between financial and non-financial measures.
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Kaplan and Norton (2001c) developed the BSC as a means of helping organizations specify the
critical elements necessary in implementing growth strategies.
Financial measures have traditionally been used to evaluate performance in the private
sector. One of the classic works involving the effects of reliance on accounting performance
measures (RAPM) examined the effect of RAPM on job-related tension (JRT) (Hopwood, 1972).
This study found that too much emphasis on accounting measures for performance evaluation
resulted in increased JRT and dysfunctional behavior. Subsequently, Otley (1978) found
conflicting results but suggested that the effects of RAPM in performance appraisal could be
mitigated by the appropriateness of the budgetary measures of performance. In other words, the
amount of JRT caused by RAPM is determined by the perceived fairness of the budget figures by
which the employee is evaluated. These studies led to a large body of research concerning the
relationships among systematic differences in the environment (Govindarajan, 1984).
Kaplan conducted research for approximately one year and worked with 12 companies on
the cutting edge of management practices to develop the BSC model. Kaplan and Norton (1992)
described their model as “a set of measures that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive
view of the business” (p. 71). More recently, it has also been proposed that a good scorecard
measures process, products, and outcomes and reflects key values of both producers and
customers (Lawton, 2002). Additionally, a good scorecard should be elastic and flexible enough
to react to strategic changes caused by environmental turbulence (Laitinen, 2005). Therefore, a
truly balanced scorecard aligns strategic objectives with customer priorities and should be used
as a mechanism for strategy implementation, not strategy formulation (Kaplan & Norton, 1996c).
Furthermore, by aligning the BSC with other organizational strategies such as customer
priorities, SWOT analysis, and quality function deployment, the scorecard can be translated from
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vague strategy into specific actions (Ip & Koo, 2004). This ability to align strategic objectives
with customer priorities is especially important for public agencies, since a clause in the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 instructed federal agencies to
“consult” with stakeholders during the strategic development process so that the agency could be
more responsive to public interests (Franklin, 2000).
For each perspective of the BSC, managers must identify the organization’s goals and
objectives while simultaneously developing measures to achieve these goals. Additionally,
cause-and-effect relationships must also be established among objectives and measures in all
perspectives so that they can be managed and validated. To avoid information overload, the
number of measures identified is limited to those that are most critical to organizational success.
Managers must also be realistic about their expectations as to what performance measurement
systems can and cannot do. By applying principles adapted from the physical sciences, managers
must realize that uncertainty exists within the arena in which they operate (Palmer & Parker,
2001).
In addition to problems with performance measurement in general (Bouckaert & Peters,
2002; De Lancer Julnes, 2001; Grizzle, 2002), problems were identified concerning the basic
assumptions and relationships within the BSC (Hellein & Bowman, 2002; Norreklit, 2000). First,
it was found that there was an interdependent relationship, as opposed to a causal relationship,
between the perspectives within the BSC, thereby causing problems in strategy formulation.
Another problem that was identified was a “gap” between the planned strategy and the actions
actually undertaken (Norreklit, p. 75, 2000). In other words, strategy deployment had generally
been ignored, resulting in implementation problems. Norreklit (2000) suggested that the
implementation of a “coherent” set of performance measurements based on a coherent strategy
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be used to alleviate these shortcomings (p. 82), with a coherent strategy being defined as one in
which the properties of the different perspectives are “integrated and harmonized,” allowing the
plans to be achieved through the working together of the properties of the different areas of focus
(p. 84). Thus, “the implementation of a coherent set of performance measurements should be
based on a coherent strategy” (p. 84).
Other drawbacks have also been identified (KPMG, 2001). One asserted drawback is that
the four perspectives are too limiting. There is a lack of consideration in the existing perspectives
for knowledge-creation processes and intellectual capital. Some critics of the BSC have even
suggested that a “human resource perspective” should be added to help the company focus on the
performance drivers that originate from human capital. Additionally, the model has been
criticized for having little focus on the external environment (KPMG). By not monitoring outside
forces such as market and other competitive changes, the organization makes itself more
susceptible to unexpected environmental fluctuations.
Turning once again to the example using the OSDBU Agency, if the BSC were
implemented, there would be specific goals under each of the four major areas—financial,
customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth. Some examples of types of
agency goals could be to decrease general operating expenses by 7%, increase the number of
clients served by 10%, cut the amount of time that it takes to process a customer request by 15%,
and to make sure that every client that was served during the past fiscal year would be contacted
as a follow up. The budget is then allocated to activities related to accomplishing these goals.
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Summary
In this chapter, the development of budgetary formats over the past 100 years was
examined (see Table 1). A chronicle of the progression of budgetary models from simple lineitem budgets to multifaceted measurement models such as the BSC was presented. A description
of the BSC and its design were then discussed and its shortcomings were evaluated.
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Table 1
Budget Format Characteristics

Budget format

Measurement
type

Measurement
emphasis

Key
organizational
purposes

Example(s)

Line-Item

Inputs

Accountability

Resource
consumption
control and
budgetary
accountability

Amount spent
on supplies; the
number of
employees per
1,000 residents

Performance

Output

Efficiency

Efficiency
Improvement
Production and
process control

The number of
clients served;
the number of
contracts
secured

Planning,
Programming
Budgets

Outcomes

Effectiveness

Improvement of
resource
allocation
decision making

Percentage of
total budget
amount
allocated to a
particular
program

Zero-Based

Output and
outcomes

Effectiveness

Improvement of
budgetary
decision-making

The amount for
a program in
each decision
package

New
Performance

Outcomes

Effectiveness

Improvement of
organizational
performance and
accountability

The number of
healthy children
in a specific
jurisdiction

Balanced
Scorecard

Financial/
Non-Financial

Effectiveness

Development of
an integrated
performance
management
system

% of budget
spent per
strategic goal
and others
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Although the BSC was designed primarily for the commercial sector, by examining the
existing literature and integrating the various findings, the researcher developed a new
measurement model, the Modified Balanced Scorecard (MBSC) model. The improvement and
adaptation of the original model is the purpose of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER III
THE MODIFIED BALANCED SCORECARD MODEL
In this dissertation, existing budgetary measurement systems are examined and integrated
to more accurately reflect the dimensions of performance measurement exhibited in the various
microcosms of public organizations. With Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard Model
(BSC) as the latest in the evolution of these models, the existing literature is used to modify and
further develop this model specifically for use in public organizations. This chapter explains the
significance of this research.

Trends in Performance Measurement
Just as some parts of government are being reinvented, so is accountability being
reinvented (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998). As the way the business of government is conducted
changes, so does the role that accountability plays in that entire process. The trend towards
increased accountability is joined by a simultaneous trend towards increased performance
(Halachmi, 2002a). This increase in emphasis on accountability has caused most governmental
organizations to institute some type of internal auditing process to measure performance and to
provide a broader picture of what is going on in the organization (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998).
Internal auditing presents a more multidimensional view than financial auditing, which looks at
only one aspect of the organization. This new type of performance or operational auditing, used
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in the public sector, thereby replaces financial auditing, used in the commercial sector, as the
measure of success (Dittenhofer, 2001).
Performance monitoring is not a tool that should be seen as an end in and of itself, and
neither is performance assessment. Rather, both of these are tools that should be used as
incremental steps in helping public managers be more accountable in their positions and improve
public programs (Wholey & Hatry, 1992). Increased emphasis on accountability and reliance on
performance or operational auditing are tools that should lead to performance management or
effective governing for results (Hatry, 2002). Performance monitoring and assessment should
help public managers and administrators specify relative service goals, expectations, and
strategies, because they can foster increased communication among the various government
stakeholders. For example, it helps legislators “articulate service goals and expectations in
budget discussions” (Wang, 2002a, p. 31).
Performance measurement is used in all stages of the budget cycle (Wang, 2000).
Regardless of the type, a performance measurement system must simultaneously have validity,
clarity, reliability, legitimacy, and functionality to be considered the appropriate tool to use in
that particular situation (Bouckaert, 1993; Grizzle, 1985). Additionally, the system should be
incremental in order to increase acceptance and help prevent errors in the budgeting process
(Schick, 1994; White, 1994). Performance measurement systems tend to evolve over time (Clary,
Eberstein, & Harlor, 2000) as performance measurements are used in all stages of the budget
cycle (Wang, 2000). Finally, the administrative and political environment influences how the
performance measurement system is defined and implemented (Clary et. al., 2000; Schick,
1994). One of the biggest problems in evaluating performance measurement systems is the
differing perceptions of use and success among the various “budget players” (Melkers &
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Willoughby, 2001, p. 54). Therefore, the adequacy of the performance measures being proposed
or used is largely situational (Brooks, 2002; Broom, 1995; Dinesh & Palmer, 1998; Parker,
2000).
While traditional financial performance measures are good at measuring how effective
managers are at earning profits in past periods, there are a number of other ways of assessing
organizational effectiveness other than the financial. Financial performance measures are lagging
indicators of performance, involve only historical data, and use strictly financial data. These
measures do not consider the positive effects of managerial duties that affect the future
profitability of an organization. Focusing too much on results can cause employees to pursue
activities or make decisions that are beneficial to the organization in the short term but
detrimental in the long term. For example, from the researcher’s years of experience in project
management, the forgoing of routine maintenance and repairs makes quarterly expenses seem
lower but can result in major damage and the need for subsequent repairs. Focusing too much on
results may also weaken employees’ commitment to democratic-constitutional values
(Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002).
Other ways of assessing organizational effectiveness might include actions such as
spending time and money to train employees or paying overtime to technicians in order to ensure
greater customer satisfaction. These types of duties sometimes directly conflict with the idea of
making more profit in the private sector or being cost efficient in the public sector during a
specific period, as they can result in additional expenses incurred. Yet without these activities, an
organization loses its ability to effectively compete or even function in today’s changing
environment.
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Effective performance measurement is a planning, budgeting, and accountability tool that
should be used to effectively increase performance (Behn, 1995; Fischer, 1994). Humanistic
concepts, such as benchmarking, continuous improvement, and participation are simply other
types of organizational management theories that evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The
trend in performance measurement has moved away from simply looking at efficiency measures
and toward the humanistic side of the organization. Additionally, there has been a call for a more
systematic approach to performance measurement implementation (Frank & DeSouza, 2004),
because so many fundamental questions remain regarding effective performance measurement
implementation. These performance measurement tools should also be applied in order to avoid
organizations’ being stagnant and unresponsive to today’s changing environment. (Kouzmin,
Loffler, Klages, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1999).
Other limitations of simply using financial performance measures have also been
documented. While the assumption is sometimes made that the best indicator of future
performance is past performance, this assumption is not necessarily true. Because of the
historical nature of accounting data, financial measures can be lacking in predictive ability, as
they do not measure the factors that contribute to improved future performance (Ittner &
Larcker, 1998). By ignoring these factors and allowing managers to be rewarded for good shortterm performance only, management may actually be encouraging rewards for the incorrect
behavior. Additionally, the effectiveness of the performance measurement tool is limited by the
knowledge of the governmental manager using the tool (Streib, 2005). The effectiveness of the
tool is also limited by other key elements within the tool itself, including the reliability and
relevance of the performance data and cost data used within the tool (Pizzarella, 2004).
Furthermore, some researchers feel that performance measurement is simply a form of
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administrative idealism that is really not used as much as was once thought (Kelly, 2002).
Nevertheless, the overwhelming motivation to use performance measures stems from a desire to
make better decisions and to maintain accountability to citizens and other stakeholders, rather
than from the need to meet reporting requirements (Poister & Streib, 1999). It has also been
proven that the use of performance measurement impacts organizational efficiency,
effectiveness, and accountability (Wang, 2000). With all of this being said, it is evident that one
of the essential questions of the future will be how to move to full adoption and implementation
of the citizen-drive, data-driven, decision-making (Holzer & Yang, 2004).
Relying too much on financial measures for performance evaluation can also result in
dysfunctional behavior of the subordinates being evaluated (Hirst, 1981, 1983; Hopwood, 1972;
Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983). Because financial performance measures fail to include all
relevant dimensions of managerial performance in situations where high task and environmental
uncertainty exists, managers may view these measures as unfair, leading to anxiety and jobrelated tension (Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Weissenfeld & Killough, 1992). Additionally, it
has been determined that the financial and economic dimensions of microfinance institutions (i.e.
governmental agencies) can effectively be assessed using traditional measures. However, a BSC
approach is necessary to evaluate the social objectives, as well as to accommodate the specific
nature of microfinance institutions (Koveos & Randhawa, 2004).
In the private sector, financial measures (for example, increasing revenues, decreasing
costs, maximizing shareholder wealth) are the universally accepted indicators of success, and
these measures ultimately determine the performance of the organization. Though some may
argue that customer service is more important, based on the notion that satisfied customers will
lead to financial performance, organizational survival depends on an organization’s ability to
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satisfactorily meet its financial obligations. Regardless, there is no such universally accepted
measure of success in the public sector. This is why Kaplan and Norton’s BSC, which was
specifically designed for the private sector, should be modified.

Public Interest Values and the Balanced Scorecard Model
The BSC has been a major topic in performance measurement literature in recent years,
with many articles focusing on the strategy involved in the implementation of the BSC
(Bollinger, 2002; Frank & DeSouza, 2004; Frigo, 2002; Kaplan & Norton, 2001c; Sim & Koh,
2001; Van Veen-Dirks & Wijn, 2002). Although non-financial measures such as those in a BSC
are being used more and more in developing and deploying strategy (Amaratunga, Baldry, &
Sarshar, 2001), one survey showed that financial measures are still the measures being focused
on for performance evaluation (Frigo, 2002). Some studies explained how the BSC is being used
in specific industries (Chang, Lin, & Northcott, 2002; Penney, 2002). Other research has focused
on performance after the adoption of a BSC (Frigo, 2002; Hoque & James, 2000; Malina &
Selto, 2001). Using time-series data, Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan (2000) demonstrated a
significant link between non-financial measures and future performance, and also demonstrated
that when incentives are tied to non-financial measures, future performance improves even more.
A number of studies have discussed the advantages of developing a BSC for specific
industries. The need for the BSC in healthcare administration worldwide was discussed by
Forgione (1997). The advantages of the BSC in healthcare were also addressed by Chow,
Ganulin, Haddad, and Williamson (1998). More recently, use of the BSC has been researched in
academic institutions (Dorweiler & Yakhou, 2005), in the hotel industry (Evans, 2005), in
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research and development firms (Bremser & Barsky, 2004), in libraries (Self, 2004), and in
microfinance institutions (Koveos & Randhawa, 2004).
Other important issues involving BSC model implementation in healthcare organizations
have also been addressed. For example, with increased concern over public interests such as
healthcare costs, Griffith and Pattullo (2000) recommended a BSC approach for integrated health
systems, although they suggested eight major perspectives for this field due to the uniqueness of
the population served.
Few studies have investigated the effectiveness of the BSC model as a performance
measurement tool. Some studies have looked at various components of the BSC (Hoque &
James, 2000; Johnsen, 2001). However, the reliability of this model compared to that of other
tools already in use has not been evaluated. There may be inherent problems with using the BSC
model because it uses multiple measures. Lipe and Salterio (2000) were the first to demonstrate a
cognitive difficulty in using the BSC model, in that their results show that managers tended to
evaluate their divisions on common measures only, with a disregard for measures that are unique
to the division. When evaluating multiple business units, their study showed that superiors
ignored unique measures for specific units and used only the common measures for determining
performance. This bias can be reduced, however, if there is an assurance report over all measures
and the evaluator is required to justify the evaluation to a superior (Libby, Salterio, & Webb,
2002).
Another study by Lipe and Salterio (2002) showed how people react differently
depending on how the measures in a BSC are categorized. The amount of weight given to each
variable is considerably different depending on whether the variable is grouped with other
variables or listed separately where there is no clear relationship with other variables.
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BSC was capable of capturing the value-creating activities from an organization’s
intangible assets such as innovative products and services, customer loyalty and relationships,
and employee skills and motivation. Kaplan and Norton contended (1992) that these assets could
not be adequately valued through traditional financial measures alone. As the authors gained
experience through the implementation of the BSC in over 200 various organizations (Kaplan &
Norton, 1996a), they determined that it had evolved into an effective tool for organizations to
implement and direct their strategies throughout their organizations. The BSC came to be seen as
a system that provides real insight into an organization’s operations, balances the historical
accuracy of financial numbers with the drivers of future performance, and assists in
implementing strategy (Niven, 2002). As the BSC model has continued to grow and flourish,
Kaplan and Norton have continued publishing papers on the subject (Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan &
Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e,
2004a, 2004b, 2004c).
The research on the BSC since its inception has been vast, though most of it has
concentrated on either the implementation or the effects of implementing a BSC (Helfrich &
Filip, 2000; Lawton, 2002). When being used as a tool in the governmental sector, the BSC
measures are often used to support various other management functions and are often applied to
other models. One such model is the environmental scanning model, also known as SWOT
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis (Lee & Ko, 2000). The BSC model has
also been applied to the McKinsey 7-S model, which was developed by Tom Peters and Robert
Waterman (1982). This model basically describes the seven factors critical for effective strategy
execution. Only a few projects have studied the BSC as a performance measurement tool
(Banker et al., 2000; Libby et al., 2002; Lipe & Salterio, 2000). Some suggested areas of further
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research include the use of subjective versus objective measurements, the effects of using broad
sets of metrics in performance measurement systems, and determining what “balance” is in the
BSC (Ittner & Larcker, 1998). Other researchers have called for an assessment of long-term
impacts, as opposed to stand-alone process measures such as outcome measures (Voytek et al.,
2004).

The MBSC Model
When the BSC was developed, it was significantly different from any existing
performance measurement system in existence. This evolutionary performance measurement
model brought researchers a few steps closer to answering the age-old questions regarding what
to measure, how definitions and techniques are chosen, and how they are linked to other aspects
of an organization’s structure (Chan, 2004). Over the years, a variety of applications and an
assortment of variations have emerged, and much has been written about the BSC and its
penetration into mainstream performance measurement and management systems.
Developed in 1992, the BSC was proposed as a means of summarizing the variety of
benchmarks that businesses must satisfy in order to be successful in an increasingly competitive
world. Furthermore, Kaplan and Norton (2001b) found that many organizations have a strategic
planning group that focuses on developing long-range plans and a business planning group that
independently develops operating and capital plans. This independence has resulted in over sixty
percent of organizations not having a link between their budgets and their strategies (Kaplan &
Norton, 2001d). Linking budget and strategy can be accomplished by using the BSC to guide
organizations to results by integrating the organization’s strategy throughout its functioning.
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Kaplan and Norton (1992) contended that the BSC should play a major role in the
budgeting process in that it should be the tool on which spending decisions should be based.
They argued that there were basically two budgets within an organization, the operational budget
and the strategic budget. The operational budget consists primarily of non-discretionary spending
and expenses that are determined by the level of current operations necessary to provide the mix
of goods and services that sustains the organization. The strategic budget involves the spending
necessary to support future organizational growth. By dividing the budget this way, discretionary
spending can be limited to initiatives that drive future performance and are linked to the
organization’s strategy. The BSC is the link between these processes, enabling managers to
effectively manage both tactics and strategies.
Another approach to budgeting is to use the BSC to develop budgets that use strategy as
the center of the process. Niven (2002) suggested a budgeting process whereby spending is
focused on achieving specific strategic objectives, as opposed to simply modifying the previous
year’s budget. This approach is different from the one proposed by Kaplan and Norton (1997b)
in that only one budget encompassing both operational and strategic initiatives is created. This
approach forces everyone within an organization to constantly remain aware of the
organizational strategy and the drivers of long-term performance.
The proposed Modified Balanced Scorecard (MBSC) model (see Figure 2) is based on
five perspectives, as opposed to the original model which has four. Each of these perspectives
will vary from sector to sector, as well as from organization to organization. The “learning and
growth” and “internal management processes” perspectives will be most similar for all
organizations. The “financial accountability,” “client perspective,” and especially the “public
good” perspectives will basically be different. This is due to the inherent differences between the
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public sector and the private sector. The goal of private organizations is measured by
profitability, whereas that of public organizations is measured by their contribution to the
provision of public goods . Clients of public services do not directly pay for many services that
they receive from public organizations whereas customers (clients) of private organizations do
pay for the most of goods and services they receive. Private organizations report mainly to their
private stakeholders, while public organizations respond to a broader range of stakeholder groups
including citizens, public interest groups, and legislative bodies.
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CLIENT PERSPECTIVE

PUBLIC GOOD
policy

(recipient of services:
fee-based and subsidized)

FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
efficiency and effectiveness
measures

(elected officials, senior
executives, and other external
stakeholders, including citizens)

VISION
AND
STRATEGY

INTERNAL
MANAGEMENT
PROCESSES
(managers and executives)

(all employees)

LEARNING AND
GROWTH
(employees)
Figure 2. Modified Balanced Scorecard Model

47

Perspectives Most Similar Between the Two Models

Internal Management Processes
The “internal management processes” dimension of both the BSC and MBSC models
incorporates the measures related to business processes that have the most significant impact on
the day-to-day operations of the business. All organizations should strive to develop internal
mechanisms for assessing performance that inspire managerial thinking, thereby leading to
increased performance (Ammons, 2002). These internal management processes define the
administrative processes and provide the structure necessary to conduct operations. In both the
public and private sectors, these processes have an influence on the system that is ultimately used
(Clary et. al., 2000).
There is a set of general management functions that summarizes the work of a Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), regardless of the sector. The list appeared in Luther Gulick’s classic
essay, Notes on the Theory of Organization (Gulick, 1937) and included planning, organizing,
staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. Whether the manager is functioning in
the public or private arena, the challenge is to integrate all of these functions in a way that
maximizes results.
In both sectors, it is important that performance be empirically studied; however the
results of these studies should not simply categorize and describe management behavior. In the
field of management, effectiveness needs to be studied for the purpose of improving the
performance of managers (Cohen, 1993).
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For the Office of Supplier Diversity and Business Utilization (OSDBU), management
functions include activities such as assisting client firms in obtaining contracts and subcontracts
with NASA and its prime contractors and developing and presenting courses such as Training
and Development for Small Businesses in Advanced Technologies (TADSBAT). The relative
measures would typically relate to the number of clients processed per week or the number of
participants attending a training course given by the OSDBU. Another example is examining
whether employees found a way to streamline the paperwork process associated with their
activities, and any “best practices.”

Learning and Growth
The environment in both the public and private sector is very dynamic and changes at an
increasingly rapid rate. Therefore, organizations must remain flexible and responsive to maintain
their existence during these volatile times. In order to remain competitive, both public and
private organizations must invest in their employees. To create a productive working
environment in public institutions, managers must not only focus on the needs of the public, but
also on the needs of each individual employee (Rector & Kleiner, 2002). Additionally, structures
must be instituted that will motivate employees to work towards attainment of organizational
goals. So in addition to training and development for its clients, employees of the OSDBU must
keep abreast of changes and developments that affect both their clients and themselves. These
changes include developmental activities such as updating technological skills, learning about
changes within the legal and legislative environments, and general continuing education so that
clients can get the highest quality assistance available. Therefore, the learning and growth
dimensions are common to both the BSC and MBSC models.
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Additional Similarities
In both the private and public sectors, organizational strategy remains at the core of the
BSC model (Niven, 2002; Venkatraman & Gering, 2000; Ziegenfuss, 2000). Strategy involves
broad priorities that must be pursued in order to achieve the organization’s mission. These
priorities must be consistent with the unique situational variables associated with the
organization and its ability to effectively respond to threats and opportunities as they arise. The
problem for public organizations is that these organizations often have a difficult time
developing and conveying a clear, concise strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 2001b; Niven, 2002).
First, public agencies often have considerable difficulty in clearly defining their strategies. This
difficulty in defining strategies is partially due to the fact that components of performance in
public and nonprofit organizations include not only the efficiency of operations and the
satisfaction of constituents, but also the adequacy of agency funding and the attainment of
agency goals (Brooks, 2002). Second, given that achieving financial success is not the primary
objective for most public agencies, the scorecard must be altered and customers (or constituents)
must be placed at the top of the hierarchy.

Perspectives Most Different Between the Two Models
The two perspectives discussed above—management processes and learning and
growth—are common to both the public and the private sectors, and thus to both the BSC and the
MBSC models. Additionally, all organizations, whether public or private, must consider
financial aspects of managing their operations; therefore these perspectives will remain the same
for both models. All organizations have internal business processes that allow for the smooth
day-to-day operations necessary to conduct business. And all organizations have learning and
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growth through various types of employee training and development, either in informal, on-thejob-training, or structured courses in a formal class setting.
The focus of this present research is on the three perspectives that are different in the
public and private sectors, which then result in differences between the BSC and MBSC models.
These differences provide the impetus for the development of the MBSC model and the study
that provided the foundation for this dissertation. The development of this new model is the
significant contribution this dissertation provides to the existing body of knowledge. In this
dissertation, existing budgetary models are synthesized into the MBSC model, which are
developed to evaluate the effectiveness of programs administered by federal governmental
agencies (see Figure 2). The MBSC model includes input from both the stakeholders and
customers/clients, thus reflecting the views of these often-opposing perspectives.
While a crucial responsibility for public managers is to be held accountable for efficient
decision making, administrative efficiency is not their ultimate purpose. Public servants work to
serve a higher purpose to achieve organizational outcomes that are desirable to the public and
can be measured quantitatively (Niven, 2002). Nevertheless, the effort to achieve and measure
the public’s desired outcomes in the public organization is hindered by difficulties inherent in
public organizations. One such difficulty is that it is often difficult to identify the customers and
their true interests.

Financial Accountability
The general trend toward increased financial accountability started in the early 1990s
with the passing of the CFO Act of 1990 (Riley, 1995). More recently, the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was passed, resulting in a call for a more
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widespread emphasis on accountability within the public sector, in addition to a general changing
of the nature of performance measurement in government (Halachmi, 2002b; Hirschman, 2002).
The GPRA of 1993 was signed into law by President Clinton and sought to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs by establishing a system to set goals for
program performance and to measure program results (Halachmi, 2002b). Unfortunately, the
optimism surrounding this legislation is not as strong as it was when it was initially enacted
(Radin, 1998). As budgets become tighter and securing congressional funding becomes more
competitive, public agencies and their associated programs must pay close attention to the
bottom line. They must strive to stay within their budgetary constraints while generating the
maximum level of output—clients served and contracts awarded. There has also been an
increased emphasis on financial accountability in the private sector. In light of recent, highly
publicized scandals involving illegal and unethical financial practices, it is possible that
procedures, rules, and laws regarding financial accountability will become progressively more
stringent.
All financial measures are designed to measure one of two things: effectiveness (doing
the right things) or efficiency (doing things right). The difference between financial measures
within the public and private sectors is in the focus of the measures. The sole purpose for
existence in the private arena is maximization of shareholder wealth and profits. Therefore,
financial goal accountability is, by far, the single most important perspective within the private
sector. The public sector is different because financial accountability serves a different purpose
than it does in the private sector. Financial process accountability—as opposed to the financial
goal accountability found within the private sector—is the most important perspective within the
public sector (Niven, 2002). Financial process accountability emphasizes cost control. Public
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officials have the additional burden of assessing the organization’s true purpose, in addition to
counting inputs and outputs of the system. So even though public officials are accountable for
the efficient allocation of funds, the officials usually serve an additional, higher purpose, such as
the reduction of incidence of HIV or providing housing assistance to low-income families.

Client Perspective
In their original model, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) identified four categories into which
customer concerns should be assessed. These categories included time, quality, performanceand-service, and cost. An important point to bear in mind is that the researcher must be cognizant
of the fact that management and customer perceptions of organizational performance often
differ. That is why it is important to obtain feedback from customers to ensure that performance
is being measured relative to customers’ concerns, standards, and satisfaction.
The interests reflected in these measures were developed based on the preferences of
clients (more commonly referred to as customers in the private sector) of profit-seeking or
commercial organizations. These clients want specific services to be performed, they want these
services to be provided in a timely manner, and they want these services to be provided with a
reasonable level of quality. Since they are paying for these goods and services, the invisible hand
(Smith, 1776, 1961) of our capitalistic society dictates that they have a right to these demands.
However, this payment outlook is one of the inherent differences between customers or clients of
public organizations and those of private organizations. The clients of public organizations often
do not “pay” for their services, and if they do pay, the “price” is usually subsidized by taxpayer
dollars (for example, public healthcare, food stamps, housing). Therefore, the citizens within an
area pay taxes, which provide the necessary funding for the services and goods provided by
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public entities. The clients are a subset of the citizens and are the specific citizens seeking or
using the goods and services provided by the public entity.
Additionally, there are often differences between the preferences of stakeholders on the
one hand and customers/clients of public organizations on the other, and these differences can
affect the perceptions of the levels of service rendered by public organizations. Therefore, the
critical questions that must be answered by public officials before appropriate measures can be
chosen are, “Who are our customers?” and “What is our value proposition in serving them?”
(Niven, 2002; Sanger, 1998). These services also must be provided as efficiently as possible.

Public Good: Policy
Elected or other government officials include those individuals who are charged with the
responsibility of running our public organizations. Whether they are elected politicians,
appointed officials, or hired employees, they are all supposed to be accountable for using
taxpayer dollars efficiently, effectively, and responsibly. For the purpose of this dissertation, this
group will be called the “stakeholders.” They represent the body that addresses our public
interest values. The basic assumptions of public interest values are derived from our democratic
society and include, among other values, systematic governance, representational democracy,
federalism, and capitalism (VanWart, 1998). In being responsible public administrators, those in
power have an obligation to support and uphold these values. A MBSC model that has been
properly executed should encompass several of these public interest values, thereby further
defending the basic constitutional values. More specifically, a well designed MBSC should
minimally encompass the public values of systematic governance (internal processes),
representational democracy (the public good) and federalism (managers), while still reflecting
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capitalism (financial perspective). Furthermore, a well-designed MBSC would protect the values
of individualism and religious choice (clients, managers).
When applying public interest values to public administrators, both elected officials and
public servants, there are four basic underlying assumptions (VanWart, 1998). The first is that
public officials should implement policy but not usurp the process or amass power. By this
scorecard being balanced, it inherently distributes both the inputs and outputs used to assess
whatever program is being evaluated. The second assumption is that public official should be
both effective and efficient with the public’s resources, and the MBSC will account for that.
Third, it supports the public’s right to know by serving as an assessment instrument that lets the
public know how various programs are doing. Fourth, it supports the public’s right to be
involved, because it allows for input for those members of the public that serve as clients and
who can attest to their experiences in participating in a particular program or dealing with a
particular agency.
In efficiently serving our public interest values, public managers should be greatly
concerned about cost, especially as the environment that these stakeholders function within
becomes increasingly competitive and budgetary constraints become tighter and tighter. On the
other side, cost is not a major concern for public clients who are receiving public services. For
example, when a client such as a food-stamp recipient or a citizen receiving hurricane relief is
seeking these services from an agency, he or she is not concerned with the cost of the program or
its operations. He or she is concerned with receiving a high level of service.
Finally, managers within public organizations have a dual set of responsibilities. First,
they must provide the general administrative and supervisory functions that all managers
perform, regardless of whether they are in the public or private sector. Also, all managers must
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answer in various degrees of accountability to assorted governing bodies. However, managers in
the public arena have the additional responsibility of satisfying other stakeholders, who
sometimes have opposing views, such as citizens who want increasing levels of services (better
schools and roads) and taxpayers who want to minimize their tax bills. Though managers within
both public and private organizations are accountable to governing boards, the boards overseeing
private organizations have the same consistent goal of other managers within the organization,
namely the maximization of shareholder wealth through earning profits.
The sharpest distinction between public and private management is a fundamental
constitutional difference. In the private sector, decision-making powers of general management
are concentrated and centralized in the upper echelons of an organization, which is composed of
the owners and managers of the organization. In a very small organization, this could be one
person such as an owner/president. In large organizations, this would encompass all of those
persons on the organizational chart with a job title of supervisor on up to the CEO. In contrast, in
the U.S. government, the functions of general management are constitutionally spread among
competing institutions: the executive branch, the two houses of Congress, and the courts
(Allison, 1996). Thus the power is shared by a number of individuals whose ambitions are set
against one another. The goal of the separation of responsibilities is to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power.
These officials must learn to dialogue with fellow professionals and elected officials in
order to demonstrate the intelligent management of contradictory motives and forces (Roberts,
2002). These political considerations must be carefully navigated, since they play a major role in
defining and implementing the system that is ultimately adopted (Clary et al., 2000).
Additionally, conducting this type of dialogue can help resolve the accountability paradox and
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avoid the atrophy of personal responsibility and political authority. The accountability paradox is
the situation faced by public officials wherein they have a personal responsibility to reach goals
and to be ethical public servants, while also having the political authority to establish the goals
for their organization. In other words, they establish the goals that they must reach.
Research has shown that using a participatory approach in developing performance
measurement standards generally facilitates more cooperation satisfaction among the participants
(De Lancer Julnes, 2001; De Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001). Research also shows that the
performance of governmental agencies may be enhanced by letting the agents select the
performance measures in the scorecard themselves and by having the agents monitor themselves
and each other (Johnsen, 2001). Additionally, using a performance-oriented approach for
strategy formulation as opposed to the traditional approach allows for the development of an
integrated, holistic performance measurement system that can be used as a performance
management system (Kloot & Martin, 2000). Moreover, adding citizen engagement builds an
even more effective means of community governance (Marshall, Wray, & Epstein, 1999),
especially when more specific subjective indicators are used instead of general satisfaction when
evaluating the level of service (Stipak, 1979). Though subjective measures of performance have
not always been widely accepted, they do yield results that are statistically similar to those
generated using objective measures (Parks, 1984). It has also been found that the multi-item
measurement scales (e.g., BSC) generally perform better than single-item (i.e. financial)
measurement scales (Ryzin, 2004).
In the original model, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) did not really have to distinguish
between the financial good and the organizational good because both perspectives are perfectly
aligned in the private sector. They are not closely aligned in the public sector, which is why the
57

model should (or must) be modified. The MBSC addresses the deficiencies of the traditional
measures that were developed for the private sector.

Summary
This chapter explored the history of performance measurement. The researcher reviewed
the literature and presented a chronological progression of the evolution of performance
measurement. Initial measures were based on line-item budgets, which are financial measures
based strictly on inputs. The next major category of measures that were reviewed were
performance budgets, which primarily are efficiency measures based on output. The third major
category of measures were PPBS, which are effectiveness measures based on outcomes. The
fourth major category of performance measures were zero-based budgets, which are also
effectiveness measures based on output and outcomes. The fifth category of performance
measures were new performance budgets, which are effectiveness measures based on outcomes.
The culmination of these measures was the BSC, which is primarily the integration of both
financial and non-financial measures and which represents a holistic strategic management
system that measures overall effectiveness and efficiency..
The BSC, which was introduced by Kaplan and Norton in 1992, has grown to be one of
the most widely used strategic management tools in the world. The BSC, which was developed
primarily for use in the private sector, was extensively evaluated as a performance measurement
tool and was modified into the MBSC, which is a model that has been customized for use
specifically in the public sector.
In Chapter IV, the details regarding the way this study was conducted are explored. More
specifically, the preferences of public managers and their clients regarding the role of their
58

programs are explored. Data from both managers and clients are used to determine the specific
performance measures that should be included in each perspective of the MBSC model.
Additionally, indicators are examined to determine if any accurate predictors of preferences can
be identified.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The literature regarding performance measurement preferences for federal managers and
the clients of the programs that they administer is lacking and has not been well documented.
The body of knowledge is virtually nonexistent and there is no empirical evidence. At least one
study (Wang, 2002a) looked at performance measurement preferences of local officials.
However, in this study, the researcher’s purpose was to determine if there was a preference for
output or outcome measures, rather than looking at specific measures. Therefore, in this
dissertation, the researcher explored the measurement preferences of stakeholders and clients of
federal programs. This chapter outlines the methodology for conducting this study. The data
collected in this study were used to determine the preferred performance perspectives of the
public managers versus the preferred performance perspectives of the clients.
As a reminder, the research questions were considered in this dissertation are as follows:
1.

What measures should be included in the MBSC model?

2.

What are the stakeholders’ preferences for the measures?

3.

What determines stakeholders’ preferences for the measures?

Model Overview
The MBSC model developed in this dissertation was used as the framework for
determining the performance measurement preferences of federal managers and the clients of
60

their programs. The model is based on five perspectives that were developed to give a balanced
assessment of a public organization, without an over-reliance on financial measures. Each of
these perspectives will vary from sector to sector, as well as from organization to organization.
However, the general model includes a financial perspective, a learning and growth perspective,
an internal management processes perspective, a client perspective, and a public good
perspective.

Research Strategy
For the purposes of this dissertation, the researcher used convenience surveys for the
clients and mail surveys for the managers. Since the purpose of this study was to measure
preferences, the researcher determined that surveys were the most appropriate medium for
gathering the necessary data. These types of surveys were chosen for various reasons. First, the
researcher chose to use a convenience survey because of the nature of the customers being
surveyed. This population consists of small business owners, who are generally very busy and
have a tendency to ignore these types of requests or delegate it to some other person within their
organizations. Therefore, administering surveys at a conference where the attendees were the
actual business owners was deemed a most rational approach to soliciting their personal
opinions. This convenience survey was especially desirable because questionnaires administered
in group settings typically have a high response rate (Trochim, 2002). Additionally, if the
respondents are unclear about the meaning of a question, they can ask for clarification right onthe-spot.
Second, the research was cross-sectional as opposed to longitudinal. Cross-sectional
surveys are used to gather information on a specific population, at a specific point in time
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(Babbie, 1973). Cross-sectional surveys can also be also useful in determining the relationship
between two factors like the experience level of a business owner and his or her preference for
performance measures.
Third, this type of research is non-probability sampling. In this type of sampling,
members are selected from the population in some nonrandom manner (Babbie, 1973). These
customers were solicited to answer a survey as they enter into the conference area. The
researcher and her assistant were physically at a table next to the registration table and
conference attendees were asked and encouraged to complete a survey when they entered the
conference. Therefore, each attendee had an equal chance of being solicited to complete a
survey, with the exception of those attendees that left and re-entered conference activities for
whatever reason. Non-probability sampling includes convenience sampling (such as the type of
sample used in this dissertation), judgment sampling, quota sampling, and snowball sampling.
Since the collection of information about personal preferences was the purpose here, the
use of this type of perception survey was justified and preferred over other methods. By being
there with the customers, the researcher and her assistant could reasonably ask people who
initially refused to reconsider answering a survey. According to Fowler (1993), between onequarter and one-third of respondents who initially refuse will agree to be [surveyed] when asked
again at a later time. Therefore, this trend was predicted to increase the response rate.

Research Procedures
The sampling frame of this study included small business owners in attendance at the 15th
Annual OSDBU Procurement Conference, which was held on April 21, 2005, at The Show Place
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Arena in Upper Marlboro, Maryland . The conference announcement was distributed
electronically and by regular mail. The e-mail list was compiled from three sources:
1.

Business owners that had attended previous conferences

2.

Business owners that had e-mailed the OSDBU office with questions and
requests for information

3.

Names and addresses of businesses provided by the Small Business
Administration (SBA)

Business owners that had previously used the services of the OSDBU were also contacted
by mail. Therefore, this was a select group of attendees who were all predicted to have a working
knowledge of the OSDBU, its purpose, and its operations. The expected attendance at the
conference was between 1,200 and 1,500 and the researcher expected a response rate of 20% or
approximately 250. Attendees registered up to the last minute, which made it impossible to get
an accurate list of attendees until the conference actually took place.
The researcher chose to survey the business owners using a direct, point-of-contact
approach, as opposed to mailing hard-copy surveys or e-mailing electronic surveys. Using the
knowledge and experience gained from representing the NASA Educator Resource Center
(ERC) and Exploration Station (ES) at numerous events, the researcher and her assistant used
direct, face-to-face contact to encourage conference attendees to participate in this study. The
researcher chose to conduct this phase of the research using convenience sampling because of the
nature of the research being conducted. This venue provided the opportunity for the data to be
both distributed and collected on site. By using this type of direct contact with the respondents
and this method of gathering data, response time was minimized, since the surveys were
collected on the spot.
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Conducting this type of convenience sample also provided the opportunity for the
researcher to experience this event alongside the business owners, enabling the researcher to
interact with the business owners, to hear their conversations and concerns, and to observe the
business owners as they networked with those federal managers in contract decision-making
positions. This unique opportunity exposed the research team to a wealth of rich, qualitative data
that the research team would otherwise not have been privy to.
This conference was a one-day event that was sponsored by the Federal government
OSDBU, and it focused on networking and educational opportunities. It targeted small
businesses, federal government agencies, and large businesses, thereby exposing the small
business owners to both federal agencies with whom they can secure governmental contracts and
large businesses with whom they can secure governmental sub-contracts. This conference
basically allowed these entities to connect with each other and assist each other in fulfilling
specific contracting needs and requirements.
At the conference, the research team conducted surveys at the first event, which was the
opening reception that was held on the evening prior to the actual start of the conference. During
this time period, the research team was stationed next to the registration table. As attendees
registered, they were given a survey and were encouraged to complete it. As an incentive, some
type of trinket with a value of less than $1.00 was given to each survey participant when they
completed and submitted their surveys by placing them in a sealed box with a slot on the top of
it.
The second registration period was from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on Thursday April 21,
2005. During these registration periods, the research team was located in close proximity to the
registration table and concentrated their efforts on distributing the surveys. However, the
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research team was present at all times during scheduled events in order to ensure that things went
as planned and to encourage attendees to submit their completed surveys.

Description of the Client Survey Questions
A copy of the actual survey instrument can be found in Appendix A. This section briefly
discusses the purpose of these questions.
Question 1 asked the respondents to identify their position within the company. Question
2 asked the respondents to classify their business according to the various socioeconomic
categories established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). These questions are
demographic questions which give a general description of the respondent and the business itself,
both of which are characteristics that could possibly influence a respondent’s preferences for
performance measures.
Question 3 asked the respondents if they are “Top 100” contractors. This is the elite
group that falls within the category of the 100 businesses receiving the most contract dollars
from each federal agency. Being a business that has reached this status, the contractor would
have had a lot of exposure to the federal contracting arena. This level of experience, coupled
with the large amounts of revenues involved here would more than likely have an influence on a
respondent’s preferences for performance measures.
Question 4 asked the respondents how long their businesses had been in operation. The
respondent’s level of experience as a business owner could possibly affect their preference for
performance measures. This question also served as a filter question, in that a business is not
qualified to bid on federal contracts until they have been in operation for at least two years.
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Question 5 asked if the business has ever received a federally subsidized loan (i.e., an
SBA loan). This question gives a general indication of a respondent’s level of reliance on federal
programs and the respondent’s level of experience in dealing with the bureaucracy involved in
doing business with the federal government.
Question 6 asked the respondent to indicate the level of revenues that their business
earned during the previous year. The amount of revenues gives a general indication of the
solvency and the size of the business, either of which could possibly have an effect on a
respondent’s preferences for performance measures.
Questions 7 and 8 asked if the business had ever received a prime contract with the
government and, if so, what type of contract. These questions show the amount of experience the
business owner had in dealing with the federal government and the amount of entrepreneurial
experience the business owner had. Primarily prime contractors have been in business longer and
are larger businesses than those who are not. Also, the type of contract won will indicate the type
of services generally offered by the businesses. More specifically, the researcher has categorized
these as supplies and equipment, research and development, technical services, and other. The
category indicated here could possibly influence a respondent’s preference for performance
measures. For example, a contractor that wins a contract in research and development or
technical services could possibly have different preferences for performance measurement than
other, more general contractors that provide supplies or maintenance.
Question 9 also referred to the type of prime contract won in Question 7. This question
asked if the contract was won competitively or through a set-aside program. The answer to this
question would indicate the respondent’s reliance on government programs. The answer would
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also indicate the socioeconomic status and the size of the business, in that there are certain
parameters that must be met in order to qualify for a set-aside.
Question 10 asked if the business had ever been awarded a sub-contract with a federal
agency. Similar to Question 7, this question would suggest the amount of experience one has in
dealing with the federal government. These businesses should tend to be smaller and less
experienced than those found in Question 7.
Question 11 asked if the business owner had received training through an OSDBU
program. This would indicate the respondent’s familiarity with and general knowledge of the
OSDBU and the services that it has to offer.
Question 12 asked if the business had ever been part of a teaming agreement and
Question 13 asked if the business had ever participated in the Mentor-Protégé Program.
Combined, these questions indicated the business owners’ willingness to take full advantage of
the types of services and programs offered through the OSDBU. Business owners who have
participated in both of these programs are people who have taken full advantage of the
opportunities available to expose themselves to the appropriate individuals for winning contracts.
Question 14 asked if the business was ISO certified. It is generally a requirement that a
business be ISO certified in order to become involved in the contracting arena.
Question 15 asked what the customer feels that the primary mission of the OSDBU is.
This question was designed to determine if the customer has an accurate and realistic
understanding of what the true goals of the OSDBU are and how they go about accomplishing
those goals.
Question 16 was the most crucial question in this survey. The purpose of this question
was to determine the customer’s actual preferences for performance measures. The questions
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were categorized based on the five perspectives of the MBSC model and were grouped
accordingly, though this categorization was not revealed to the respondent.
Questions 17 through 19 were general demographic questions. However, the
characteristics being questioned here were all features about a respondent that could have an
impact on preferences for measuring performance. These qualities were age, gender, and
educational level attained. As people tend to mature, their views on life tend to change as well.
Their spirit of idealism yields to the fortitude of realism, thus causing their preferences for
measuring performance to change. Gender is also a quality that could possibly have an impact on
the respondent’s performance measurement preferences, since women and men often view things
differently. There might also be differences in preferences based on whether the respondent is a
high school graduate versus a four-year college graduate.

Description of the Federal Manager Surveys
A copy of the instrument is presented in Appendix B. Many questions in this survey are
the same in the client survey described above, although there are questions specifically designed
for this respondent group. Question 1 asked the respondents to identify their positions within
their respective federal agencies or departments. Question 2 asked the respondents how long they
had worked in their current positions. Question 3 asked the respondents how long they had
worked for their respective federal agencies or departments. Questions 4 and 5 asked the
respondents if they had worked for any other federal agencies or departments and, if so, how
long. Question 6 asked the respondents to indicate their total number of years of federal
governmental experience.
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Collectively these first six questions are an indication of how much exposure each
manager had to the federal government as a total system. The number of different federal
positions an individual has held, the number of years of federal experience, and the highest rank
attained should have an impact on that individual’s preferences for performance measures.
Question 7 asked for the total dollar amount of the contracts awarded to small businesses
by that individual’s respective agency or department during the past fiscal year. As more dollars
are spent with small businesses, the individuals involved should likely become more familiar
with small businesses, thereby possibly having an effect on their preferences for performance
measures.
Question 8 asked, in the manager’s perception, what the customers of the OSDBU feel is
the primary mission of the OSDBU. This question was designed to reveal a respondent’s opinion
about what the customers want from them. By asking what the managers feel the customers
want, the researcher was really trying to determine what the managers feel about their customers.
Question 9 was the most crucial question in this survey. The purpose of this question was
to determine the manager’s actual preferences for performance measures. The questions were
categorized based on the five perspectives of the MBSC model and were grouped accordingly,
though this categorization was not revealed to the respondent.
Questions 10 through 12 are general demographic questions. These questions were
designed to elicit various characteristics about the respondent that could possibly have an impact
on how he or she viewed certain situations, thereby impacting the respondent’s preferences for
measuring performance. The characteristics being assessed in this study were age, gender, and
educational level attained. Most of the managers questioned here tended to be older than 40.
These were people that had typically worked their way up through the ranks of federal service
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and would therefore have been in the workforce for many years. Simply by virtue of their tenure
with the government, these individuals tended to be older workers, which might have had an
impact on their preferences for measuring performance.
Gender is also a variable that might possibly have had an impact on these managers’
preferences for performance measurement, and might have been reflected in this survey. From
the federal OSDBU list, the titles that are listed are Director, Associate Administrator, Deputy
Director, Women Business Rep, Veteran Business Rep, and Supplier Diversity Program
Manager. Each federal agency or department has at least one of the above listed managers, with
most having two to three. Based on their job titles, some differences in preferences could
possibly have existed.
There could possibly also have been differences in preferences based on the manager’s
level of educational attainment. Most of the respondents will have at least a four-year college
degree, with many having at least some graduate-level education. Differences in preferences for
performance measures could be reflected here based on these various educational levels.
Question 13 asked if the respondent had ever owned his or her own business. Though this
was not expected to be a large number, if the manager had owned a business before, he or she
might have been expected to have a different perception of what businesses owners’ needs are
and thereby might have had different expectations about the services that should be offered by
the OSDBU. This would likely have had an impact on their preferences for performance
measurement.
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Instrumentation and Measurement
For the purposes of this study, the researcher was attempting to determine what the
performance measurement preferences are for two separate and distinct groups. The first group
was that of federal managers. The second group was the clients that they serve. Once the
performance measurement preferences for these groups were identified, the researcher evaluated
various characteristics of each sample to see if any of these characteristics were truly indicators
or predictors of preferences.
In designing the client survey instrument, the researcher categorized the survey questions
so that the responses could be grouped into the five levels of the dependent variable. However,
the researcher has chosen to mix the order of the questions so that the visual order of the
questions won’t be thought of as a unit by the respondents (Dillman, 2000). By mixing the
questions, the researcher was encouraging the respondents to think of each question separately.
The questions are ordered in the following manner:
Questions 1–4 represent the clients’ preferences for client measures
Questions 5–8 represent the clients’ preferences for financial measures
Questions 9–12 represent the clients’ preferences for learning and growth measures
Questions 13–16 represent the clients’ preferences for internal management process
measures
Questions 17–19 represent the clients’ preferences for public good measures.
In designing the manager survey instrument, the researcher also categorized the survey
questions so that the responses could be grouped in the five levels of the dependent variable.
Once again, the researcher chose to mix the order of the questions for the same reasons as listed
above. The questions were ordered in the following manner:
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Questions 1–4 represent the managers’ preferences for client measures
Questions 5–8 represent the managers’ preferences for financial measures
Questions 9–12 represent the managers’ preferences for learning and growth measures
Questions 13–16 represent the managers’ preferences for internal management process
measures

Questions 17–19 represent the managers’ preferences for public good measures.
Though the questions on the survey instrument were mixed, the researcher took measures
to ensure that the questions could be re-categorized into groups based on preferences, thereby
maintaining the integrity of the original ordering of the questions.

Dependent Variables and Independent Variables
The primary dependent variable was constructed to represent aspects of the respondents’
preferences for performance measures. The model represented five levels of the dependent
variable derived from the MBSC model. The five levels of the dependent variable were
preference for financial measures, preference for client measures, preference for internal
management process measures, preference for learning and growth measures, and preference for
public good measures. The independent variable measures for the client surveys are represented
in Table 2.

72

Table 2
Independent Variable Measures for the Client Survey
[Variable] / Operational definition

Type

[Position] within the company

Nominal

[Socio] economic categorization of their respective businesses

Interval

[Top] 100 contractor

Nominal

[Exp] number of years in business

Continuous

[Loan] recipient of federally subsidized loan

Nominal

[Revs] level of annual revenues

Ordinal

[Prime] ever received prime contract

Nominal

[Type] of contract received

Interval

[Comp] was contract bid competitively

Nominal

[Sub] ever received sub-contract

Nominal

[Train] ever participated in OSDBU training

Nominal

[Team] ever participated in teaming agreement

Nominal

[ISO] certification

Nominal

[Mission] of the OSDBU

Interval

[Age] demo

Ordinal

[Gender] demo

Nominal

[Educ] highest level attained

Ordinal
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The independent variable measures for the Manager surveys are represented in Table 3.

Table 3
Independent Variable Measures for the Manager Surveys
Variable / Operational definition

Type

[Position] within their respective governmental agencies

Interval

[Exp] length of time in that position

Nominal

[Expagency] worked for other governmental agency

Nominal

[Expother] length of time with other agency(ies)

Ordinal

[Fedexp] total federal experience

Ordinal

[Contdoll] annual contract dollars awarded to small businesses

Ordinal

[Mission] of the OSDBU

Interval

[Age] demo

Ordinal

[Gender] demo

Nominal

[Educ] demo

Ordinal

Measuring Client and Manager Preferences in the MBSC
On the client surveys, Question 16 was primarily designed to reveal what measures the
customers feel are important. The answers compiled from this section collectively represented
the customer preferences for performance measures. A modified five-point Likert scale was used
for this series of responses, with the responses beings as follows:
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Very important = 4
Important = 3
Somewhat important = 2
Not important = 1
Don’t know or can’t say = 0
The “don’t know or can’t say” responses were not included in the calculations.
On the manager surveys Question 9 was primarily designed to reveal what measures the
managers perceived to be as important. On the client survey, Question 15 primarily solicited the
same information. The answers compiled from these questions collectively represented the
manager preferences and client preferences for performance measures, respectively. With the
exception of the questions mentioned above, the remainder of the questions on both surveys were
designed to establish what determines the client and manager preferences for performance
measures, thereby identifying specific indicators of performance preferences. The researcher was
evaluating a mix of demographic and other characteristics of the clients and managers in order to
determine if they have effects on the respective performance measurement preferences.
Additionally, there was a question on each respective survey that asked what the respondent
understood the mission of the OSDBU as being.
The general statements of hypotheses for this research were as follows:
H1: Clients have different preferences toward different performance measures specified
in the MBSC model.
H2: Managers have different preferences toward different performance measures
specified in the MBSC model.
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H3: Organizational and demographic variables specified in this study are associated with
clients’ preferences for performance measures.
H4: Organizational and demographic variables specified in this study are associated with
managers’ preferences for performance measures
The researcher used the data collected in this study to determine if these hypotheses
should be accepted or rejected. Additionally, the researcher used the data to determine the order
of the preferences of the respondents and generalized the results to the general population of
small business owners and federal managers.

Summary
In this chapter, the researcher explained the methodology for determining the
performance measurement preferences of federal managers and the clients that they serve,
including their opinions regarding the purpose of the OSDBU. Both a sample of federal
managers and a sample of their clients were surveyed to determine what their performance
measurement preferences were and if there were any indicators that might predict what those
preferences might be based on specific characteristics. In other words, the researcher wanted to
determine which variables possibly have an effect on the preferences of the respondents for
performance measures.
Chapter V presents the results from the client survey. Chapter VI presents the results
from the manager survey. The survey questions used to solicit the preferences of both sets of
respondents were identical, with the exception of the questions used to measure the control
variables or demographic characteristics. This enabled the researcher to make a comparison of
the respective preferences and draw conclusions.
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CHAPTER V
CLIENT SURVEY RESULTS

Introduction
This chapter presents the statistical results of the client survey. This analysis was
primarily conducted in two parts, and these two parts were designed to answer the second and
third research questions, which are “what are the stakeholders’ preferences for performance
measures?” and “what determines the preferences?” The underlying premise is that it is critical
to identify such preferences to guide the design and development of an appropriate measurement
system so that the measures in the system are more likely to be accepted by stakeholder groups.
In this study, preferences of clients and managers are examined. The managers are responsible
for the design of a measurement system and the clients are the recipient of the services or
products that are measured by the system. This chapter focuses on the preferences of clients on
the measures.

Univariate Analysis

Univariate Analysis of the Dependent Variables
Table 4 presents the survey items that were used to measure the dependent variables that
represent the client preferences for the performance measures. Actual survey items and their
corresponding measurement perspectives are included in the table.
77

Table 4
Survey Items to Measure the Dependent Variables—Preference for Performance Measures
Item Perspective

Actual survey item

A

client

the number of clients that participate in the Mentor–Protégé Program

B

financial

dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client

C

employee

the number of employees that attend job related training workshops

D

employee

percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their performance appraisals

E

financial

dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU

F

client

the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements

G

processes

the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a contract

H

public good

the percentage of citizens who are happy with the performance of the OSDBU

I

client

the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs

J

financial

the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients annually

K

employee

the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or higher

L

client

the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level of service
provided by the OSDBU

M

processes

the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU

N

processes

the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU clients

O

processes

the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become certified

P

financial

the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients

Q

employee

the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually

R

public good

the percentage of elected officials who are satisfied with the performance of the
OSDBU

S

public good

the percentage of it SBA mandated goals achieved
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The questions on the client-survey instrument were categorized so that the responses
were grouped into the five designed measurement perspectives: financial perspectives, client
perspectives, employee perspectives, internal management process perspectives, and public
goods perspectives. By mixing the order of the questions, the researcher altered the visual
arrangement so that the questions would not be thought of as a unit by the respondents (Dillman,
2000), thereby encouraging the respondents to think of each question separately and
independently.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ preferences for performance
measures. Percentages of “very important,” “important,” “somewhat important,” and “not
important” of each individual item measuring preferences toward performance measures are
presented in the table. The means and standard deviations of these survey items are also
presented.
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Table 5
Descriptive Analysis of Respondents’ Preferences for Performance Measures
Variable

% Very
important

% Important

% Somewhat
important

%
Not
important

Mean

Std dev

Client
Item A
Item F
Item I
Item L
Average

10.0
3.3
8.6
22.9
11.2

12.9
13.0
23.7
57.3
26.73

52.0
70.3
52.9
8.6
45.95

19.6
6.9
9.0
7.2
10.68

2.02
2.00
2.21
2.92
2.29

.973
.770
.929
1.04
.930

Financial
Item B
Item E
Item J
Item P
Average

19.7
12.7
42.9
36.9
28.05

30.3
35.5
37.8
44.4
37.0

31.0
42.0
9.7
10.0
23.18

13.1
6.5
6.1
5.7
7.85

2.45
2.51
3.20
3.07
2.81

1.12
.98
1.20
.98
1.07

Employee
Item C
Item D
Item K
Item Q
Average

3.3
9.8
6.1
2.9
5.53

6.9
14.1
8.6
7.2
9.20

44.9
56.9
12.2
42.3
39.08

31.9
12.7
45.7
39.4
32.43

1.55
2.08
1.21
1.57
1.60

.919
.958
1.12
.85
.96

Processes
Item G
Item M
Item N
Item O
Average

45.3
2.9
7.5
37.3
23.25

35.3
14.7
14.0
40.5
26.13

12.2
64.5
50.9
6.5
33.53

7.2
15.1
16.1
15.8
13.6

3.24
2.00
1.90
2.99
2.53

.985
.727
1.03
1.04
.95

Public Good
Item H
Item R
Item S
Average

7.6
17.2
43.0
22.6

19.8
35.1
35.5
30.13

39.6
23.3
13.6
25.5

24.5
24.4
1.8
16.9

1.93
2.45
3.07
2.48

1.04
1.04
1.09
1.06

Note: These items are labeled in Table 4
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Table 5 shows several interesting findings. First, on average, survey respondents scored
2.81 on the items measuring preferences for financial measures (with 4 = very important,
3 = important, 2 = somewhat important, and 1 = not important), the highest average score of all
measures of the five measurement perspectives. This result indicates that, on average, clients
prefer financial measures more than any other type of measures. The result suggests that,
although OSDBU is a governmental agency with goals of serving public interests, both financial
performance and financial condition are of interest to the clients. This illustrates the importance
of effectively and efficiently managing the financial resources of governmental agencies.
Another interesting finding in Table 5 is that there are no apparent differences between
preference for internal management process measures (mean = 2.53), preference for public good
measures (mean = 2.48), and preference for client measures (mean = 2.29). Clearly, respondents
on average think these measures are “somewhat important”(2) or “important”(3) in assessing the
performance of OSDBU.
The findings in Table 5 also show that preference for employee measures is the least
preferred category of client preferences (mean = 1.60). It is possible that business clients believe
that employee management is an internal organizational function, as opposed to being a concern
of the clients. It is also possible that respondents may perceive that it is the responsibility of the
management of the agency, not its clients, to assess and monitor employee performance.

Client Perspective Analysis
Preference for financial measures received the highest overall scores, with a mean score
of 2.81. Preference for financial measures also had the tightest overall fit, with a range of 0.75.
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The highest score within this perspective was 3.20 and the lowest score within this perspective
was 2.45.
Preference for employee measures received the lowest overall scores, with a mean score
of 1.60. The range of scores exhibited in this perspective was relatively small, with the range
being 0.88. The highest single score in this perspective was 2.08, and this was the only score
over 2.0. The other scores in this category ranged from 1.21 to 1.60.
The perspective with the most disparity was internal management processes, with a range
of 1.34. Internal management processes also had the highest single score of 3.24. The response
associated with this score was “the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a
contract”—an outcome measure.
The second highest single score was 3.20. This score was associated with the response
“the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients annually.” This response is
also an outcome measure. Tied for third were “the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU
clients” and “the percentage of SBA mandated goals achieved,” both with mean scores of 3.07
and both outcome measures.
In considering the relationships among and between the various preferences, it is
interesting to look into the relationship among these five measurement perspectives to gain
information on how they impact each other. Table 6 shows correlation coefficients between the
five measurement perspectives:
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Table 6
Client Correlation Matrix of Index Dependent Variables
Financial
Financial

Client

Internal

Employee

Public good

1.0

Client

.620

1.0

Internal

.362

.456

Employee

.505

.573

.399

Public good

.435

.379

.194

1.0
1.0
.599

1.0

Several findings of the correlation analysis of the dependent variable are important. First,
there is a strong relationship between preferences for client measures and preferences for
financial measures. The correlation coefficient for this combination is .620. This indicates that
respondents who prefer client measures also prefer financial measures.
Another relatively strong correlation is between public good measures and employee
measures (r = .599). Respondents who prefer public good measures tend to prefer the measures
of employee performance. This relationship suggests that respondents tend to believe that
employee performance constitutes of a significant part of what is perceived to be the public
good. Collectively, the employees are those people who actually serve the public and are thus
those who operationalize and implement public programs. They are the ones that are face-to-face
with those clients that receive the public services and goods.
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A third potentially significant relationship is that between preference for financial
measures and preference for employee measures (r = .505). Both types of measures, in addition
to the internal management process measures, represent functional areas that primarily fall under
the responsibility of the agency managers. Of the five perspectives, these three perspectives are
basically internal to the public organizations. The public managers or administrators and the
employees operate within the public organization, and they use internal management processes
to administer public processes. The other two perspectives represent perspectives found outside
of the public organization, with those being the public good and the clients.

Univariate Analysis of the Independent Variables
Table 7 presents survey items measuring independent variables. Actual survey items and
their abbreviated variables names used in analysis of this study are presented in the table.
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Table 7
Survey Items to Measure the Independent Variables
Item #

Item description

Variable name

1

current position

Posc

2

business classification

Classc

3

top 100 contractor

Topc

4

years business has been in operation

Expc

5

rec’d federally subsidized loan

Loanc

6

annual gross revenues

Revsc

7

ever awarded a prime federal contract

Primec

8

type of contract awarded in #7

Contypec

9

contract in #7 competitive or set-aside

Compc

10

ever awarded a subcontract

Subc

11

ever rec’d training through OSDBU

Trainc

12

ever participated in a teaming agreement

Teamc

13

ever participated in mentor-protégé program

Mentc

14

ISO certified*

ISOc

16

understanding of the OSDBU’s mission

Missionc

17

respondent’s age

Agec

18

respondent’s gender

Genderc

19

respondent’s level of educational attainment

Educc

*International Organization for Standardization
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There are 19 independent variables in this analysis. This chapter presents the univariate
analysis of selected variables that may interest the reader the most. The variables selected for
detailed analysis are annual revenues for the respondent’s business, respondent’s level of
entrepreneurial experience, whether the respondent has ever been awarded a prime contract,
whether or not the respondent is ISO certified, and whether or not the respondent has ever been
awarded a subcontract. These variables represent the mean responses that were rated most highly
by the clients.
Table 8 describes the frequency distributions of annual revenues of respondents’
businesses. It is interesting to note that 58.4% of the respondents have revenues of $750,001 or
more annually or 45% of the respondents have annual revenues that exceed $1,000,000.

Table 8
Annual Revenues of Respondents’ Businesses (N = 260)
Annual revenue

Number of cases

Percentage of total

Less than $100,000

27

10.4

$100,001 to $250,000

36

13.8

$250,001 to $500,000

36

13.8

$500,001 to $750,000

9

3.5

36

13.8

116

44.6

$750,001 to $1,000,000
More than $1,000,000
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Table 9 shows frequency distribution of respondents’ level of entrepreneurial experience.
It is also interesting to note that almost 45% of these respondents have been in business for over
10 years.

Table 9
Respondents’ Level of Entrepreneurial Experience (N = 279)
Years of experience

Number of cases

Percentage of total

18

6.5

1–2 years

9

3.2

3–4 years

27

9.7

5–6 years

73

26.2

7–8 years

18

6.5

9–10 years

9

3.2

125

44.8

Less than 1 year

More than 10 years

Findings in Table 10 show that about 58% of respondents have prime contracting
experience that directly deals with the federal government, as opposed to being subcontractors or
non-contractors.
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Table 10
Prime Contracting Experience (N = 278)
Response

Number of cases

Percentage of total

Yes

161

57.9

No

108

38.8

9

3.2

Not sure

Table 11 shows that about 58% of respondents do not have ISO certification. It is even
more interesting that almost 20% of these respondents were not sure if they were ISO certified.

Table 11
ISO Certification (N = 278)
Response

Number of cases

Percentage of total

Yes

54

19.4

No

161

57.9

Not sure

54

19.4

Missing

9

3.2
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Table 12 shows the respondents’ subcontracting experience with the federal government.
Nearly 55% of these respondents claim to have subcontracting experience, while nearly 58%
claim to have prime contracting experience.

Table 12
Subcontracting Experience (N = 278)
Response

Number of cases

Percentage of total

Yes

152

54.7

No

108

38.8

18

6.5

Not sure

The results of the above analysis on the selected variables indicate that the respondents
come from relatively large revenue companies with strong experiences in management, and the
majority of them have worked with the federal government as a prime contractors or
subcontractor. These findings suggest that this group of respondents may have sufficient
managerial and contracting background to answer the survey questions measuring perception for
performance measures in the federal government.

Bivariate Analysis
In this section, the independent variables were examined for their relationships with the
dependent variables. This analysis is a critical step in the analysis process because these
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relationships provide the foundation on which the true relationships between the independent
variables and the dependent variables are built.

Preference for Financial Measures
Table 13 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for financial
measures and the independent variables. The results show that respondents in organizations that
have larger revenues tend to prefer financial measures more (Tau-c = .200).
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Table 13
Preference for Financial Measures
Measure of association

Test of
significance

Tau-c

Lambda

p

Χ2

Revenues

.200

.000

551.7 (p = .000)

Experience

.323

.000

345.0 (p = .000)

-.024

.596

157.8 (p = .000)

.027

.579

254.2 (p = .000)

-.208

.000

299.7 (p = .000)

Age
Education
Position
Prime

.225

.000

121.1 (p = .000)

ISO

.079

.012

320.0 (p = .000)

Subcontract

.144

.000

102.8 (p = .000)

Top 100

.037

.280

73.9 (p = .000)

Loan

.198

.000

155.3 (p = .000)

Contract type

.174

.000

160.2 (p = .000)

Competitive

.206

.000

221.1 (p = .000)

Train

.163

.000

200.0 (p = .000)

Team

.064

.000

58.3 (p = .000)

Mentor

.079

.000

137.5 (p = .000)

ISO

.080

.009

321.4 (p = .000)

Mission

.217

.000

442.3 (p = .000)

Sex

.091

.005

79.8 (p = .000)

The results show that there is a negative relationship between position and preference for
financial measures in these organizations. More specifically, the higher the respondents’ position
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within the organization, the less the respondents tend to prefer financial measures. This
relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.132, p = .000).
The results also show that there is a positive relationship between revenues earned in the
organizations and respondents’ preference for financial measures in these organizations. Based
on this finding, the more revenues earned by an organization annually, the higher the level of
preference of the respondent in that organization for financial measures. Logically, this
relationship makes sense in that people from organizations that earn more would have a stronger
preference for financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level
(Tau-c = .200, p = .000).
An additional positive relationship was shown to exist between organizational experience
and respondents’ preference for financial measures in these organizations. These findings
basically show that the longer an organization has been in existence the higher the level of
preference of the respondent in that organization for financial measures. The logic behind that is
that older organizations tend to have higher levels of revenues than younger ones, especially
when one considers that fact that longevity tends to weed out less successful organizations within
the first two years. This relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level (Tau-c = .091,
p = .041).
Another relationship of interest is that between level of education attained by the
respondent and preference for financial measures. This relationship is positive and tends to show
that the more education the respondent has the less he or she tends to prefer financial measures,
with the implication being that those individuals with more education have more of an
appreciation of a balanced set of measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01
level (Tau-c = -.121, p = .006).
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An additional relationship that was shown to exist is that between organizations that have
previously been awarded at least one prime contract and preference for financial measures in
these organizations (Lambda = .225, p = .000). The average preference for financial measures
exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 3.05, while
the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have never been
awarded a prime contract is 2.49 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors
that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer financial measures more
than contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract. This finding is consistent with
the fact that prime contractors tend to be larger organizations.
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Table 14
Average Preferences of Respondents Answering “Yes” and Answering “No” on Yes–No Questions
Financial
Yes
No

Yes

Prime

3.05

2.49

ISO

3.05

Sub

Client
No

Public good
Yes
No

Processes
Yes
No

Employee
Yes
No

2.42

2.11

2.61

2.31

2.47

2.62

1.82

1.30

2.76

2.14

2.33

2.20

2.55

2.49

2.54

1.26

1.68

3.00

2.57

2.46

2.09

2.60

2.35

2.56

2.50

1.88

1.26

Top

3.00

2.87

2.50

2.29

2.83

2.48

2.50

2.53

1.25

1.60

Loan

2.57

3.05

1.98

2.25

2.25

2.64

2.64

2.29

1.41

1.84

Competitive

3.01

2.94

2.52

2.27

2.52

2.61

2.73

2.24

1.71

1.79

Train

2.65

2.95

2.36

2.31

2.27

2.61

2.71

2.48

1.71

1.76

Team

2.99

2.45

2.33

2.21

2.54

2.36

2.54

2.51

1.73

1.34

Mentor

3.06

2.74

2.41

2.26

2.15

2.55

2.64

2.50

1.49

1.62

ISO

3.05

2.76

2.14

2.33

2.20

2.55

2.49

2.54

1.26

1.68

Sex

2.63

2.60

2.11

2.39

2.37

2.54

2.43

2.53

1.43

1.44
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The results also show that respondents from ISO certified organizations tend to prefer
financial measures (Lambda = .079; p=.012). The average preference for financial measures
exhibited by contractors that are ISO certified is 3.05, while the average preference for financial
measures exhibited by contractors that are not ISO certified is 2.76 (Table 14). This finding
indicates that, on average, contractors that are ISO certified prefer financial measures more than
contractors that are not ISO certified.
Another result shows that there is a relationship between organizations that have
previously been awarded at least one federal government subcontract and preference for financial
measures in these organizations (Lambda = .144; p = .000). This finding is consistent with the
previous finding regarding prime contractors. The average preference for financial measures
exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one federal government
subcontract is 3.00, while the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors
who have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.57 (Table 14). This finding
indicates that, on average, contractors who have previously been awarded at least one federal
government subcontract prefer financial measures more than contractors who have never been
awarded a federal government subcontract.
A relationship between organizations that have never received a federally subsidized loan
and preference for financial measures in these organizations was also shown to exist
(Lambda = .198; p = .000). The average preference for financial measures exhibited by
contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan is 3.05 (Table 14), while the
average preference for organizations that have received at least one federally subsidized loan is
2.57. This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have never received a federally
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subsidized loan prefer financial measures more than contractors that have previously received at
least one federally subsidized loan.
The results from this study also show that there is a relationship between OSDBU
training and preference for financial measures in these organizations (Lambda = .163; p = .000).
The average preference for financial measures in organizations that have never received training
through the OSDBU office is 2.95 (Table 14), while the average preference for financial
measures by contractors that have received training through the OSDBU office is 2.65. This
finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have not received training through the
OSDBU office prefer financial measures more than contractors that have received training
through the OSDBU office.
Another result shows that there is a relationship between teaming agreements and
preference for financial measures in these organizations (Lambda = .064; p = .000). The average
preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have previously participated in
teaming agreements is 2.99, while the average preference for financial measures exhibited by
contractors that have never participated in a teaming agreement is 2.45 (Table 14). This finding
indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously participated in a teaming agreement
prefer financial measures more than contractors that have never participated in a teaming
agreement.
Finally, the results show that there is a relationship between mentorship and preference
for financial measures in these organizations (Lambda = .079; p = .000). The average preference
for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have participated in the mentorship program
is 3.06, while the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that never
participated in the mentorship program is 2.74 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on
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average, contractors that have had mentors prefer financial measures more than contractors that
have not had mentors.

Preference for Client Measures
Table 15 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for client
measures and the independent variables.
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Table 15
Preference for Client Measures
Measure of association

Test of
significance

Tau-c

Lambda

p

Χ2

Revenues

.305

.000

346.5 (p = .000)

Experience

.091

.041

356.6 (p = .000)

Age

-.032

.386

174.9 (p = .000)

Education

-.121

.006

258.6 (p = .000)

Position

-.132

.008

218.5 (p = .000)

Prime

.099

.011

79.8 (p = .000)

ISO

.079

.012

320.0 (p = .000)

Subcontract

.099

.015

176.2 (p = .000)

Top 100

.032

.010

70.0 (p = .000)

Loan

.182

.000

350.4 (p = .000)

Contract type

.149

.000

202.2 (p = .000)

Competitive

.128

.000

128.3 (p = .000)

Train

.145

.000

208.3 (p = .000)

Team

.069

.001

84. 5 (p = .000)

Mentor

.078

.000

224.7 (p = .000)

ISO

.069

.006

360.3 (p = .000)

Mission

.198

.000

429.3 (p = .000)

Sex

.108

.000

78.9 (p = .000)

The most noteworthy level of association is that between revenues and preference for
client measures. This result shows that there is a positive relationship between revenues and
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preference for client measures in these organizations. More specifically, the more revenues
earned by an organization annually, the higher the level of preference of the respondent in that
organization for client measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level
(Tau-c = .305, p = .000).
There also appears to be a positive relationship between experience and preference for
client measures, though the relationship is weak but significant at the .05 level (Tau-c = .091,
p = .041). As a result, the longer the client has been in business, the more he or she would tend to
prefer client measures.
The relationships between position and education with preference for client measures are
negative and relatively weak (Tau-c = -.132, p = .000; Tau-c = -.121, p = .006). Therefore, the
higher the rank of the business owner (i.e. CEO, President, Partner, CFO, VP, etc.) and the more
education the respondent, the less he or she tends to prefer client measures.
Other relationships were also examined and found to have some level of significance.
According to the results obtained here, there is a relationship between organizations that have
previously been awarded at least one prime contract and preference for client measures, though
the level of association is weak (Lambda = .099; p = .011). The average preference for client
measures exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is
2.42, while the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that have never
been awarded a prime contract is 2.11 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average,
contractors that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer client measures
slightly more than contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract.
These results show that there is a slight relationship between not being ISO certified and
preference for client measures (Lambda = .079; p = .012). The average preference for client
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measures exhibited by contractors that are not ISO certified is 2.33 (Table 14), while the average
preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that are ISO certified is 2.14. This finding
indicates that, on average, contractors that are not ISO certified tend to prefer client measures
more than organizations that are ISO certified, but just slightly more.
These results also show that there is a relationship between subcontracting and
preference for client measures (Lambda = .099, p = .015). The average preference for client
measures exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one federal
government subcontract is 2.46, while the average preference for client measures exhibited by
contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.09 (Table 14).
This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously been awarded at least
one federal government subcontract tend to prefer financial measures more than contractors that
have never been awarded a federal government subcontract.
The results show that there is a relationship between Top 100 contractors and preference
for client measures (Lambda = .032, p = .010), though the relationship is almost infinitesimal.
Regardless, the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that are
considered to be Top 100 contractors is 2.50, and the average preference for client measures
exhibited by contractors that are not Top 100 contractors is 2.29 (Table 14).
The results also show that there is a relationship between organizations that have never
received a federally subsidized loan and preference for client measures (Lambda = .182;
p = .000). The average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that have never
received a federally subsidized loan is 2.25 (Table 14), while the average preference for
organizations that have received at least one federally subsidized loan is 1.98. This finding
indicates that, on average, contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan prefer
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client measures more than contractors that have previously received at least one federally
subsidized loan.
Additionally, the results show that there is a slight relationship between OSDBU training
and preference for client measures (Lambda = .145, p = .000). The average preferences for client
measures in organizations that have received OSDBU training and organizations that have never
received training through the OSDBU office are almost equal at 2.36 and 2.31, respectively
(Table 14). This finding indicates that there is literally no difference in the preference for client
measures between contractors that have participated in the various opportunities for training
offered by the OSDBU and those contractors that have not.
Another result shows that there is a slight relationship between teaming agreements and
preference for client measures (Lambda = .069; p = .001). The average preference for client
measures exhibited by contractors that have previously participated in teaming agreements is
2.33, while the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that have never
participated in a teaming agreement is 2.21 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average,
contractors that have previously participated in a teaming agreement very slightly prefer client
measures more than contractors that have never participated in a teaming agreement.
A slight relationship was shown to exist between mentorship and preference for client
measures in these organizations (Lambda = .078; p = .000). The average preference for client
measures exhibited by contractors that have participated in the mentorship program is 2.41,
while the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that never participated
in the mentorship program is 2.26 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors
that have had mentors prefer client measures just slightly more than contractors that have not had
mentors.
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Finally, these results show that there is a slight relationship between sex and preference
for client measures (Lambda = .108; p = .000). The average preference for client measures
exhibited by male respondents is 2.11, while the average preference for client measures by
female respondents is 2.39 (Table 14). This finding indicates that male and female respondents
are almost equal in their preference for client measures.

Preference for Public Good Measures
Table 16 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for public
good measures and the independent variables.
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Table 16
Preference for Public Good Measures
Measure of association
Tau-c

Lambda

Test of significance
Χ2

p

Revenues

.231

.000

281.8 (p = .000)

Experience

.141

.001

398.5 (p = .000)

Age

-.080

.074

192.2 (p = .000)

Education

-.203

.000

276.4 (p = .000)

Position

-.180

.000

370.9 (p = .000)

Prime

.118

.004

70.8 (p = .000)

ISO

.079

.012

320.0 (p = .000)

Subcontract

.124

.004

86.4 (p = .000)

Top 100

.056

.193

52.4 (p = .000)

Loan

.153

.000

129.5 (p = .000)

Contract type

.149

.000

116.8 (p = .000)

Competitive

.279

.000

115.7 (p = .000)

Train

.120

.002

142.8 (p = .000)

Team

.067

.037

49.2 (p = .000)

Mentor

.048

.188

116.2 (p = .000)

ISO

.133

.001

341.3 (p = .000)

Mission

.301

.000

463.9 (p = .000)

Sex

.085

.071

75.0 (p = .000)

The most noteworthy relationship with preferences for public good measures is that of
those organizations that have won bids for contracts that were won competitively
(Lambda = .279, p = .000). The results show that the average preference for public good
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measures exhibited by those respondents that have won competitive bids for federal contracts is
2.52, while the average preference for public good measures exhibited by those respondents that
have not won any competitive bids for contracts is 2.61 (Table 14). This finding indicates that,
on average, contractors that have competitively secured at least one federal contract prefer public
good measures more than contractors that have not been able to competitively secure a federal
government contract. In addition to those recipients that have never secured any type of federal
contract, the latter category includes those respondents who have secured federal contract dollars
through set-asides and through other means such as grants.
There also appears to be a relationship between revenues and preference for public good
measures. This relationship is significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = .231, p = .000). The results
show that there is a positive relationship between revenues earned by the organization and the
respondents’ preference for public good measures within these same organizations. More
specifically, the more revenue an organization earns annually, the higher the level of preference
for client measures.
Another apparent relationship is that between education and preference for public good
measures (Tau-c = -.203, p = .000). The results show that relationship is negative between
respondents’ highest level of education attained and their preference for public good measures.
More specifically, the more education the respondent has, the less he or she tends to prefer public
good measures.
The results show that there is a slight negative relationship between position and
preference for public good measures in these organizations (Tau-c = -.180, p = .000). More
specifically, the higher the respondents’ position within the organization, the less the respondent
tended to prefer financial measures.
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When considering the relationship between experience and preference for public good
measures, a slight relationship seems to exist (Tau-c = .141, p = .001). More specifically, the
more experience the respondent has within the business, the more the respondent tends to prefer
public good measures.
A slight relationship also seems to exist between organizations that have previously been
awarded at least one prime contract and preference for public good measures in these
organizations (Lambda = .118; p = .000). The average preference for financial measures
exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 2.61, while
the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have never been
awarded a prime contract is 2.31 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors
that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer financial measures slightly
more than contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract.
The results also show that there is somewhat of a relationship between ISO certification
and preference for public good measures (Lambda = .079, p = .012). The average preference for
public good measures for respondents that come from organizations that are ISO certified is 2.20
and the average preference for public good measures for respondents that come from
organizations that are not ISO certified is 2.55. This finding indicates that, on average,
contractors that are not ISO certified prefer public good measures slightly more than those
contractors that are ISO certified.
Additionally, the results show that there is somewhat of a relationship between
organizations that have previously been awarded at least one federal government subcontract and
preference for public good measures (Lambda = .144; p = .000). The average preference for
public good measures exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one
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federal government subcontract is 2.60, while the average preference for public good measures
exhibited by contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.35
(Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously been
awarded at least one federal government subcontract prefer public good measures slightly more
than contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract.
The results also show that there is a relationship between receiving a federally subsidized
loan and preference for public good measures in these organizations (Lambda = .153; p = .000).
The average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have never received
a federally subsidized loan is 2.64 (Table 14), while the average preference for organizations that
have received at least one federally subsidized loan is 2.25. This finding indicates that, on
average, contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan prefer public good
measures slightly more than contractors that have previously received at least one federally
subsidized loan.
There is also an apparent relationship between OSDBU training and preference for public
good measures in these organizations (Lambda = .120, p = .002). The average preference for
financial measures in organizations that have never received training through the OSDBU office
is 2.61 (Table 14), while the average preference for financial measures by contractors that have
received training through the OSDBU office is 2.27. This finding indicates that, on average,
contractors that have not received training through the OSDBU office prefer public good
measures slightly more than contractors that have received training through the OSDBU office.
Teaming agreements and preference for public good measures also appear to have a
relationship in these organizations (Lambda = .067; p = .037). The average preference for public
good measures exhibited by contractors that have previously participated in teaming agreements
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is 2.54, while the average preference for public good measures exhibited by contractors that have
never participated in a teaming agreement is 2.36 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on
average, contractors that have previously participated in a teaming agreement prefer public good
measures more than contractors that have never participated in a teaming agreement.

Preference for Internal Management Process Measures
Table 17 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for internal
management process measures and the independent variables.
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Table 17
Preference for Internal Management Process Measures
Measure of association
Tau-c

Lambda

Test of significance
p

Χ2

Revenues

-.106

.035

186.3 (p = .000)

Experience

-.138

.001

322.0 (p = .000)

.000

252.1 (p = .000)

Age

252.08

Education

-.163

.001

180.6 (p = .000)

Position

-.106

.047

309.2 (p = .000)

Prime

.254

.000

134.8 (p = .000)

ISO

.079

.012

320.0 (p = .000)

Subcontract

.147

.000

125.3 (p = .000)

Top 100

.215

.000

158.0 (p = .000)

Loan

.198

.000

251.8 (p = .000)

Contract type

.170

.000

196.7 (p = .000)

Competitive

.216

.000

137.9 (p = .000)

Train

.155

.000

169.8 (p = .000)

Team

.000

—

36.4 (p = .000)

Mentor

.045

.032

100.3 (p = .000)

ISO

.064

.002

176.4 (p = .000)

Mission

.219

.000

329.7 (p = .000)

Sex

.141

.002

76.5 (p = .000)

The results shown here tend to support the notion that there appears to be a negative
relationship between position and preference for internal management process measures. More
specifically, the higher the respondents’ position within the organization, the less the respondents
108

tend to prefer financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level
(Tau-c = -.106, p = .047).
The results also tend to show that there is a negative relationship between annual
revenues earned by an organization and respondents’ preference for internal management
process measures. More specifically, the more revenue an organization earns annually, the less
the respondent tended to prefer internal management process measures. This relationship is
statistically significant at the .05 level (Tau-c = -.106, p = .035).
A negative relationship also appears to exist between organizational experience and
respondents’ preference for internal management process measures. More specifically, the longer
an organization has been in existence, the less the respondent tends to prefer internal
management process measures. This relationship is significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.138,
p = .001).
A positive relationship seems to exist between age of the respondent and preference for
internal management process measures. More specifically, the older the respondent is, the more
he or she tends to prefer financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01
level (Tau-c = -.152, p = .000).
Based on the results of this study, a negative relationship seems to exist between level of
education attained by the respondent and preference for internal management process measures.
More specifically, the more education the respondent has, the less he or she tends to prefer
financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.163,
p = .001).
The most noteworthy level of association with respondents’ preferences for internal
management process measures is with prime contracting. The results show that there is a
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relationship between organizations that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract
and respondents’ preferences for public good measures in these organizations (Lambda = .254,
p = .000). The average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have
previously been awarded at least one contract is 2.47, while the average preference for financial
measures exhibited by contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract is 2.62
(Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously been
awarded at least one prime contract tend to prefer financial measures slightly less than
contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract.
Another slight relationship that seems to exist is that between organizations that are ISO
certified and preference for internal management process measures (Lambda = .079; p = .012).
The average preference for internal management process measures exhibited by contractors that
are ISO certified is 2.49, while the average preference for internal management process measures
exhibited by contractors that are not ISO certified is 2.54 (Table 14). This finding indicates that
contractors that are and contractors that are not ISO certified tend to prefer internal management
process measures at about the same level.
Based on the results of this research there appears to be somewhat of a relationship
between organizations that have previously been awarded at least one federal government
subcontract and preference for internal management process measures (Lambda = .147;
p = .000). The average preference for internal management process measures exhibited by
contractors that have previously been awarded at least one federal government subcontract is
2.56, while the average preference for internal management process measures exhibited by
contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.50 (Table 14).
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Another relationship that seems to exist is that between organizations that have never
received a federally subsidized loan and preference for internal management process measures in
these organizations (Lambda = .198; p = .000). The average preference for internal management
process measures exhibited by contractors that have received at least one federally subsidized
loan is 2.64, while the average preference for organizations that have never received a federally
subsidized loan is 2.29 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have
received at least one federally subsidized loan prefer internal management process measures
more than contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan.
There is also an apparent relationship between OSDBU training and preference for
internal management process measures in these organizations (Lambda = .155; p = .000). The
average preference for internal management process measures in organizations that have
received training through the OSDBU office is 2.71, while the average preference for internal
management process measures by contractors that have never received training through the
OSDBU office is 2.48 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have
received training through the OSDBU office prefer internal management process measures more
than contractors that have not received training through the OSDBU office.
There is a very slight relationship between mentorship and preference for internal
management process measures in these organizations (Lambda = .045; p = .032). The average
preference for internal management process measures exhibited by contractors that have
participated in the mentorship program is 2.64, while the average preference for internal
management process measures exhibited by contractors that never participated in the mentorship
program is 2.50 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have had
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mentors prefer internal management process measures more than contractors that have not had
mentors.
The results also tend to show that there is a relationship between sex and preference for
internal management process measures (Lambda = .141; p = .002). The average preference for
internal management process measures exhibited by male respondents is 2.43, while the average
preference for internal management process measures by female respondents is 2.53 (Table 14).
This finding indicates that male and female respondents are almost equal in their preference for
internal management process measures but with female respondents preferring internal
management process measures slightly more than male respondents did.

Preference for Employee Measures
Table 18 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for
employee measures and the independent variables.
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Table 18
Preference for Employee Measures
Measure of association

Test of
significance

Tau-c

Lambda

p

Χ2

Revenues

.200

.000

551.7 (p = .000)

Experience

.385

.000

348.0 (p = .000)

Age

.099

.049

199.4 (p = .000)

Education

.067

.099

220.7 (p = .000)

-.122

.006

331.6 (p = .000)

Position
Prime

.098

.000

83.1 (p = .000)

ISO

.079

.012

320.0 (p = .000)

Subcontract

.135

.000

102.3 (p = .000)

Top 100

.019

.680

69.2 (p = .000)

Loan

.092

.001

122.1 (p = .000)

Contract type

.134

.000

165.1 (p = .000)

Competitive

.103

.054

58.9 (p = .000)

Train

.124

.000

174.9 (p = .000)

Team

.083

.001

59.5 (p = .000)

Mentor

.022

.272

59.8 (p = .037)

ISO

.146

.000

370.9 (p = .000)

Mission

.198

.000

424.6 (p = .000)

Sex

.058

.007

51.4 (p = .004)

The results show that the strongest relationship with preference for employee measures is
organizational experience. More specifically, the longer an organization has been in existence,
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the higher the level of preference of the respondent in that organization for employee measures.
This relationship is significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = .385, p = .000).
There is an apparent positive relationship between organizational revenues and
respondents’ preference for employee measures. More specifically, the higher annual revenues
earned by the organization, the higher the level of preference of the respondent in that
organization for employee measures. This relationship is significant at the .01 level
(Tau-c = .200, p = .000).
There also seems to be somewhat of a negative relationship between position and
preference for employee measures. More specifically, the higher the position of the respondent,
the lower the level of preference of the respondent for employee measures. This relationship is
significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.122, p = .006).
A relatively weak relationship is exhibited between age and preference for employee
measures. More specifically, and the older the respondent, the more the respondent was likely to
prefer employee measures, but only very slightly. This relationship is significant at the .05 level
(Tau-c = .099, p = .049).
A slight relationship appears to exist between organizations that have previously been
awarded at least one prime contract and preference for financial measures in these organizations
(Lambda = .098; p = .000). The average preference for employee measures exhibited by
contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 1.82, while the average
preference for employee measures exhibited by contractors that have never been awarded a
prime contract is 1.30 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have
previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer employee measures more than
contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract.
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All of the other independent variables that were considered in this study have weak levels
of association with preference for employee measures. Therefore these variables will not be
further discussed. Additionally, since preference for employee measures was the least preferred
type of performance measures, the researcher has deemed these relationships immaterial and not
worthy of further consideration.

Summary
The following findings were presented in this chapter:
First, clients tend to prefer financial performance measures the most. Since this is the
client group that is being evaluated in this instance, one could logically expect preference for
client measures to be the most highly regarded type of performance measures. However,
financial measures were shown to be the most preferred types of measures for the client group.
This is especially surprising, considering the fact that there has been such an emphasis on the
more humanistic side, as opposed to mechanistic side, of management (i.e. balanced scorecards,
TQM, etc). Financial measures are obviously still perceived as being the most important
measures in evaluating the performance of the OSDBU.
Second, internal management process measures are the second most preferred group of
performance measures by the clients. This is a possible indication that people generally have
confidence in the security and anonymity of the bureaucratic structure. Once again, internal
management process measures would tend to be mechanistic measures. By sheer nature, highly
structured systems promote fairness and consistency, thereby minimizing the effects of political
behavior, favoritism, and nepotism. This perceived equity associated with bureaucratic structure
can serve as a potential source of motivation for the small business owner who can otherwise
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become frustrated with the divisiveness of highly political activity. These types of mechanistic
measures also provide objectivity in evaluating performance. Therefore, internal management
process measures also provide a certain level of assurance of administrative accountability for
the service and decision making processes.
Third, employee measures were the least preferred group of performance measures by
the clients. This result suggests that employees’ performance should be the concern of their
managers or supervisors, and employees’ performance may be addressed as an issue of an
agency’s internal management practice. Though employee measures are the least preferred
measures, these measures should not be misconstrued as not being important. The relationship of
employee measures to the other sets of measures is what is noteworthy. The importance of this
relationship will be expanded upon in Chapter VI.
Fourth, there were only slight differences between the client preferences for internal
management process measures and public good measures. This is an indication that there are
only slight variations in the level of preferences that the clients have for these two sets of
measures. In other words, there are no major variations in the level of preference for these
performance measures exhibited by the clients. Perhaps the clients view the measures that
determine whether or not the internal mechanisms of the organization are functioning properly as
having the same approximate level of importance as the external measures that the overseeing
organizations has on these agencies and their programs.
Fifth, there is strong correlation between preference for financial measures and
preference for client measures. This result may reflect the tendency of respondents, who are the
managers in the private sector, to link customer satisfaction with financial success. Satisfied
customers tend to be repeat customers. They also tend to promote those businesses with which
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they are satisfied via word-of-mouth advertising. Therefore, customer satisfaction tends to lead
to increased profits in the commercial arena.
Sixth, there is a strong relationship between preference for financial measures and
experience, and there is a strong association between preference for client measures and
revenues. These findings may reflect the assessment that in the private sector financial success is
the key for business. The longer respondents remain in business and the larger their
organizations become, the more they tend to realize and agree with this assessment.
Seventh, there is evidence of a relationship between preference for public good measures
and competitive status. This result may reflect the policy impact of less competitive “set aside”
contracting in which disadvantaged business owners are offered assistance. These businesses are
more favorable to the measures of public good.
Eighth, preference for internal management processes and prime contracting seem to be
related. In order for business owners to secure a prime contract with a governmental agency or
department, they must be well versed in bureaucratic processes. By conducting business with the
federal government, they must contend with the myriad of paperwork and the countless operating
procedures typified within the departments and agencies. Consequently, these business owners
should have a preference for internal management process measures. Though no one likes
bureaucracy, per se, the environment in which prime contractors function is extremely
bureaucratic, so it seems natural that these business owners would have a preference for
measures that accurately reflect this milieu.
This chapter presented the results of univariate and bivariate analyses, which are
sufficient to answer the three research questions. Multivariate analysis was conducted.
Nevertheless, multiple regression results of the client survey are very different from the results
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from the manager survey, which suggests problems in the specification of the multivariate
modeling process. Future efforts will have to validate or invalidate the bivariate and univariate
results of this study before multivariate analysis results can be reported with a certain level of
confidence. Therefore these results are not being reported in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER VI
MANAGER SURVEY RESULTS

Introduction
This chapter presents the statistical results of the manager survey. This analysis will
primarily answer the second and third research questions: “What are the stakeholders’
preferences for performance measures?” and “What determines the preferences?” As discussed
in Chapter V, the underlying premise is that it is critical to know what various stakeholder
groups want from a performance measurement system. A critical step is the identification of the
stakeholder group to which the policy is being presented so that the policy can be appropriately
framed.
In Chapter V, the results of the client survey were presented. In this chapter, the results of
the manager survey are presented. Preferences of surveyed managers to performance measures
will be presented. Managers develop and implement measurement systems. Their perception of
the importance of different measures is critical for the design and implementation of measures.
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Univariate Analysis

Univariate Analysis of the Dependent Variable
Table 19 presents survey items to measure the dependent variables that are the manager
preferences for the performance measures. Actual survey items and their corresponding
measurement perspectives are included in the table.
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Table 19
Survey Items to Measure the Dependent Variables—Preferences for Performance Measures
Item Perspective

Description

A

client

the number of clients that participate in the Mentor–Protégé Program

E

client

the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements

J

client

the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level
of service provided by the OSDBU

P

client

the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs

C

financial

dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client

I

financial

dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU

B

financial

the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients

L

financial

the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients
annually

F

employee

percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their
performance appraisals

D

employee

the number of employees that attend job related training workshops

G

employee

the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or
higher

Q

employee

the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually

K

processes

the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU

O

processes

the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU
clients

N

processes

the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become certified

M

processes

the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a
contract

H

public good

the percentage of citizens who are happy with the OSDBU’s
performance

R

public good

the percentage of elected officials who are satisfied with the OSDBU’s
performance

S

public good

the percentage of its SBA mandated goals achieved
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The questions on the manager survey instrument were categorized so that the responses
were grouped into the same five designed measurement perspectives used in the client survey
instrument: financial perspectives, client perspectives, employee perspectives, internal
management process perspectives, and public good perspectives.
Table 20 shows the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ preferences for performance
measures. Percentages of “very important,” “important,” “somewhat important,” and “not
important” for each individual item that assesses preferences towards performance measures are
presented in the table. The means and standard deviations of these survey items are also
presented.
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Table 20
Descriptive Analysis of Respondents’ Preferences for Performance Measures
Variable

%
Very
important

%
Important

%
Somewhat
important

%
Not
important

Mean

Std dev

Client
Item A
Item E
Item J
Item P
Average

—
—
—
23.4
5.85

8.7
25.8
22.7
59.4
29.15

56.7
53.9
57.0
16.4
46.0

34.6
20.3
20.3
0.8
19.0

1.74
2.05
2.02
3.05
2.22

.607
.679
.658
.656
.650

Financial
Item C
Item I
Item B
Item L
Average

12.5
—
4.7
—
4.30

57.8
11.0
50.4
9.4
32.15

28.1
50.4
38.6
60.2
44.33

1.6
38.6
6.3
30.5
19.25

2.81
1.72
2.53
1.79
2.24

.661
.651
.687
.597
.649

Employee
Item F
Item D
Item G
Item Q
Average

1.6
44.5
18.8
16.4
20.3

14.1
45.3
61.7
68.0
47.3

58.6
10.2
18.8
14.8
25.6

25.8
—
0.8
0.8
9.13

1.91
3.34
2.98
3.00
2.13

.676
.657
.640
.589
.641

Processes
Item K
Item O
Item N
Item M
Average

—
24.2
—
41.4
16.33

22.7
60.2
24.4
49.2
39.13

51.6
14.8
64.6
7.8
34.7

25.8
0.8
11.0
1.6
9.8

1.97
3.07
2.13
3.30
2.62

.698
.647
.582
.714
.660

Public Good
Item H
Item J
Item S
Average

7.1
22.6
46.8
25.5

31.7
62.1
41.3
45.0

50.0
12.1
9.5
23.87

11.1
3.2
2.4
4.9

2.35
3.03
3.32
2.90

.773
.721
.776
.757

Note: See Table 19 for item descriptions.
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Table 20 shows several interesting findings. First, on average, survey respondents scored
2.90 on the items measuring preference for public good measures (with 4=very important,
3=important, 2=somewhat important, and 1=not important), the highest average score of all
measures of the five measurement perspectives. This result indicates that, on average, managers
prefer public good measures more than any other type of measure. The result suggests that the
federal managers that work for the various OSDBU offices within the various governmental
agencies are committed to serving those to whom they report. With the public good measures
representing the elected officials, and thus the citizens of the respective jurisdictions, the
managers appear to have preferences that are aligned with those measures that reflect these
constituencies and the public in general.
Another interesting finding is that, on average, survey respondents scored 2.62 on the
items measuring preference for internal management process measures. This result indicates that
these employees have a relatively strong preference for the mechanistic processes found within
the intensely bureaucratic structure of the federal government. Since most of these managers
have more than five years experience within their current positions (Table 21), these employees
have been acclimated to the rigid policies and procedures typically found within these
organizations.
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Table 21
Respondents’ Level of Experience Within Current Position (N = 126)
Years of experience

Number of cases

Percentage of total

Less than 1 year

1

0.8

1–2 years

6

4.8

3–4 years

10

7.9

5–6 years

12

9.5

7–8 years

47

37.3

9 or more years

50

39.7

A third interesting finding is that preference for financial measures ranked third among
the federal managers. Financial measures are the bottom line within profit-seeking organizations
and are therefore the preferred types of measures for those within the private sector. However,
based on these findings, the federal managers prefer both public good measures and internal
management process measures over financial measures. This difference indicates that these
managers are more committed to serving the public and their superiors and that they are more
committed to functioning within the confines of the federal bureaucratic structure than they are
to financial measures.
A fourth finding of interest is that, just as employee measures are the least preferred
measures for the clients, employee measures are also the least preferred measures for the
managers.
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As shown in Table 22, there are no strong correlations found within this correlation
analysis of the dependent variable. This finding in and of itself possibly represents a sort of
diversity within the ranks of the respondents. Though the managers that responded to these
questionnaires are similar in that they have served in their current positions for many years, they
are also diverse in that they all work for different agencies. There are approximately three to four
respondents per agency. Therefore, these respondents are spread relatively evenly across many
agencies, thereby reflecting many different organizational expectations, norms, and values.

Table 22
Manager Correlation Table of Index Variables
Financial

Client

Internal

Employee

Financial

1.00

Client

-.003

Internal

-.063

.130

1.00

Employee

-.068

.096

-.063

1.00

Public good

-.079

-.013

-.044

-.176

Public good

1.00

1.00

Manager Perspective Analysis
Preference for public good measures received the overall highest scores, with a mean
score of 2.90. Preference for public good measures also had the tightest overall fit, with a range
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of 0.97. The highest score within this perspective was 3.32 (the second highest single score), and
the lowest score within this perspective was 2.35.
The second highest single score was 3.32. This score was associated with the response
“the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU,” which is an internal
management process measure. The third highest single score was 3.30, and this score was
associated with the response “the number of workshops and forums held per year by the
OSDBU.” As opposed to the top three responses for the client groups which preferred outcome
measures, the manager group rated output measures highest.
Interestingly, the next three highest responses, which the researcher terms “second tier”
responses, were rated extremely closely. These responses were “the average amount of time for
an OSDBU client to become certified” (3.07), “the average amount of time for an OSDBU client
to be awarded a contract” (3.05), and “the percentage of elected officials who are satisfied with
the OSDBU’s performance” (3.03). Once again, of the six highest rated responses, only the fifth
response is an outcome measure. The other measures are all output measures.
Preference for employee measures received the lowest overall scores, with a mean score
of 2.13. Interestingly, the highest single score in this perspective was 3.34, which coincidentally
was the highest overall single measure. This score was associated with the response “the number
of clients that participate in OSDBU programs.” Another interesting fact is that this perspective
also had the highest disparity, with a range of 1.43. Though preference for employee measures
was the lowest scoring perspective for both client measures and manager measures, the manager
ratings were obviously not as low as the client ratings. In other words, the managers tend to have
more regard for employee measures than clients do, though both groups rate them relatively low.
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Univariate Analysis of the Independent Variables
Table 23 presents survey items measuring independent variables. Actual survey items and
their abbreviated variable names used in analysis of this study are presented in the table.

Table 23
Survey Items to Measure the Independent Variables
Item

Description

Variable name

1

respondent’s current job title

titlem

2

amount of time in that position

posexpm

3

amount of time in that agency or department

depexpm

4

other federal agency experience

otherm

6

total years of federal government experience

fedexpm

7

annual contract dollars awarded to small businesses by that agency

contm

8

respondent’s opinion of client perception of the OSDBU mission

custm

9

has respondent ever owned own business

ownm

11

respondent’s gender

genderm

12

respondent’s age

agem

13

respondent’s level of educational attainment

educm

There are 19 independent variables in this analysis and they are the same as the ones used
in the client survey. This section of this chapter presents the univariate analysis of several
selected independent variables. The variables that were selected for detailed analysis are level of
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experience in current position, annual contract dollars awarded to small businesses by the
respective agency, the perception of client’s understanding of the OSDBU mission, age, and
gender. These variables represent the mean responses that were rated most highly and therefore
can be considered to be most important to the respondent.
Table 21 describes the frequency distribution of the respondents’ level of experience
within their current positions at their respective agencies. Approximately 77% of the respondents
have seven or more years of experience in their current positions and nearly 40% of the
respondents have nine or more years of experience in their current positions. The longevity of
these federal government managers is consistent with the nature of these positions. In order for
offices such as the OSDBU to effectively run and manage the various programs that they are
responsible for administering, the overseer needs to be a very “seasoned” executive. He or she
must have a very strong network of individuals, both within their federal governmental agencies
and entrepreneurs operating as contractors and sub-contractors. This individual must be very
knowledgeable of the administrative processes to keep the operations functioning properly.
Around 75% of these agencies award in excess of $7,500,000 to small businesses
annually (see Table 24). Around 64% of them award more than $10,000,000 annually. Though
these may sound like very large amounts, they are a mere fraction of the amounts of overall
contract dollars awarded by federal agencies each year. Though these small businesses cannot
compete with the huge prime contractors such as Lockheed-Martin or Boeing, these small
business fill critical niches that often cannot be filled by these mega corporations. They are also
often much more responsive and flexible because they do not have the strict bureaucratic
processes often associated with large companies.
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Table 24
Annual Contract Dollars Awarded to Small Businesses by Respondents’ Respective Agencies
(N = 125)
Annual contracts awarded

Number of cases

Percentage of total

18

14.4

$1,000,001–$2,500,000

9

7.2

$2,500,001–$5,000,000

6

4.8

$5,000,001–$7,500,000

0

0.0

$7,500,001–$10,000,000

12

9.6

More than $10,000,000

80

64.0

Less than $1,000,000

Though the purpose of the OSDBU is to provide information to the small business
owners, it is interesting to note that 30% of the managers feel that the small business clients
believe that it is the OSDBU’s responsibility to actually find contracts for them (see Table 25).
Additionally, nearly 24% of these managers believe that the small business clients are of the
opinion that it is the OSDBU’s responsibility to introduce them to contracting officers or those
persons that are in charge of awarding contracts. However, nearly half of these respondents were
correct in their perception of the mission of the OSDBU.
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Table 25
Respondents’ Perception of Clients’ Understanding of the OSDBU Mission (N = 193)
Respondents’ perception

Number of cases

Percentage of total

To find contracts for clients’ businesses

37

29.4

To help clients write proposals

—

—

To introduce clients to contracting officers

30

23.8

To provide sources of funds for clients’ businesses

—

—

To disseminate information to clients

126

46.8

Note: The question did not indicate that the respondent should check only one answer, and quite
a few respondents selected more than one answer.

Only 5.6% of the respondents were 30 years old or younger (see Table 26); therefore
94.4% of the respondents are more than 30 years old. This distribution is also an indication of the
experience that is necessary to effectively function in a position such as this one. Though some
of the knowledge and skills needed for this position are those types of skills that can be learned
in a classroom and through other types of formal structured learning, much of it must be acquired
through experience and longevity, particularly the people skills that must be relied upon when
interacting with all involved parties.
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Table 26
Respondents’ Age (N = 126)
Respondents’ age

Number of cases

30 or younger

Percentage of total

7

5.6

31–39

30

29.4

40–49

67

53.2

50–59

19

15.1

3

2.4

60 or older

Table 27 shows that just slightly more than half of the respondents were male and slightly
less than half female, indicating that a person of either sex can effectively function in these types
of administrative positions.

Table 27
Respondents’ Gender (N = 126)

Gender

Number of cases

Percentage of total

Male

70

55.6

Female

56

44.4
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Bivariate Analysis

Preference for Financial Measures

Table 28 presents measures of association between preferences for financial measures
and the independent variables.

Table 28
Preference for Financial Measures
Measure of association
Tau-c

Lambda

p

Test of significance
Χ2

p

Position experience

-.075

.242

17.34

.968

Annual contract dollars

-.045

.525

305.03

.408

.008

.924

8.77

.723

-.172

.003

20.74

.654

.796

2.08

.912

Mission perception
Age
Gender

.007

The results show that there is a slight negative relationship between age and preference
for financial measures Tau-c = -.172, p = .003). More specifically, the older the respondent, the
less likely he or she is to prefer financial measures. This relationship is significant at the .002
level. Age is the only independent variable that is shown to have a significant relationship with
preference for financial measures.
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Preference for Client Measures
Table 29 presents measures of association between preferences for client measures and
the independent variables.

Table 29
Preference for Client Measures
Measure of association
Tau-c
Position experience

Lambda

Test of significance
p

χ2

p

.048

.506

35.96

.209

Annual contract dollars

-.066

.336

276.31

.833

Mission perception

-.042

.602

6.16

.908

.030

.643

16.75

.859

.154

6.03

.420

Age
Gender

.043

These results do not show any independent variables that have a significant measure of
association with client measures.

Preference for Employee Measures
Table 30 presents measures of association between preferences for employee measures
and the independent variables.
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Table 30
Preference for Employee Measures
Measure of association

Test of significance
p

χ2

-.009

.885

56.37

.012*

Annual contract dollars

.049

.441

334.50

.716

Mission perception

.012

.887

12.00

.606

Age

.028

.713

60.67

.000**

.410

7.13

Tau-c
Position experience

Gender

Lambda

.035

p

.406

*p < .05. **p < .01

These results show that there is a very slight negative relationship between position
experience and preference for employee measures (Tau-c = -.009, p = .003). In other words, the
longer a respondent has been in his or her position, the less likely he or she is to prefer employee
measures. This relationship is significant at the .05 level. Age is also shown to have a
relationship with preference for employee measures (X2 = 60.67, p = .000).

Preference for Internal Management Process Measures
Table 31 presents measures of association between preferences for internal management
process measures and the independent variables.
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Table 31
Preference for Internal Management Process Measures
Measure of association
Tau-c
Position experience

Test of significance

Lambda

p

χ2

p

.045

.467

16.66

.976

-.015

.831

318.81

.218

Mission perception

.001

.994

9.84

.630

Age

.054

.447

23.40

.496

.405

10.98

.089

Annual contract dollars

Gender

.050

These results do not show any independent variables that have a significant measure of
association with internal management process measures.

Preference for Public Good Measures
Table 32 presents measures of association between preferences for public good measures
and the independent variables.
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Table 32
Preference for Public Good Measures
Measure of association
Tau-c
Position experience

Lambda

Test of significance
p

χ2

p

.011

.872

37.70

.574

Annual contract dollars

-.096

.161

383.83

.711

Mission perception

-.139

.089

18.57

.292

.010

.890

30.49

.543

.136

10.84

.211

Age
Gender

.107

These results do not show any independent variables that have a significant measure of
association with public good measures.

Summary
Based on the results of the univariate analysis, public good measures were the most
preferred measures by managers in the survey. Clients, on the other hand, preferred financial
measures most. Based on these findings, the researcher concluded that managers within the
federal government have a preference for the measures that represent and assess public good.
These measures are largely determined by those public administrators who are responsible for
developing the macro measures that the governmental agencies must abide by. Some examples
include the SBA, which sets the mandates for contracting goals and the Government Accounting
Office (GAO), which determines the financial standards for the other governmental agencies.
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The managers’ preference for public good measures may possibly be a result of, once again, a
preference for strict adherence to administrative procedure. Another possible explanation is that
these managers prefer public good measures because they are public officials and they work to
serve the interests of public, which is represented by the elected officials.
Second, preference for internal management processes was the second most preferred
measure by the federal managers. It is not surprising that these managers would prefer internal
management processes. Rank, promotions, and raises are typically more systematic in the public
sector. This is because salary grades are usually very specific and promotions are relatively well
defined within the federal government. Therefore, those managers that have chosen career paths
within the federal government have chosen to function in this environment.
Third, preference for financial measures and preference for client measures are almost
equal, though financial measures were slightly more preferred. The researcher finds this
conclusion to be especially noteworthy because both preference for public good measures and
preference for internal management process measures were rated more highly than financial
measures by the surveyed managers. This indicates that federal managers are more concerned
with administrative processes than with fiscal effectiveness. Financial success in the public
sector is difficult to assess, and traditionally these measures are not emphasized in daily
management. This finding may suggest a need to provide financial education to federal
managers, thereby enhancing their sense of fiscal responsibility.
Similar to the results of the client surveys, employee measures are the least preferred by
the federal managers. As was mentioned in the summary of Chapter V, it is interesting to note
that both clients and managers rated employee measures lowest. One logical explanation is that
the managers feel that once the individual secures a position within the governmental agency, he
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or she simply becomes a mechanism in the entire system. Once he or she becomes a part of the
system, then the individual’s performance becomes the responsibility of his or her manager.
Basically, the system should be evaluated from a macro point of view. In other words, both
managers and clients are more concerned with organizational measures as opposed to individual
measures.
None of the preferences for these perspectives were correlated with each other.
Therefore, all of these stand alone, independently. This result is surprising in light of strong
associations of clients’ preferences for measurement perspectives. Managers may clearly realize
the different roles of these measurement perspectives in assessing organizational performance,
while clients’ views of these roles may be unclear.
As was done with the results of the client survey in Chapter V, the data from the
manager’s survey and the resulting analysis presented in this chapter include only univariate and
bivariate analysis. These analyses are sufficient to answer three research questions. Though
multivariate analysis was conducted, the results from the managers’ survey were very different
from those of clients. For example, none of independent variables is found to be statistically
associated with the preferences for performance measurement, while in the analysis of client
survey, a large number of independent variables are found to be associated with the preferences.
This discrepancy leads to a possibility of a problem in the multivariate model specification.
Because of this and other reasons, these multivariate analysis results are also not being reported
in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
Despite the importance of federal managers and their clients in the administrative
process, little is known about the preferences of these groups when it comes to performance
measures. This dissertation provided an analysis of the performance measurement preferences of
federal managers and their clients. Based on the results and findings about these two groups of
stakeholders, a clearer understanding of the preferences of various groups of stakeholders
emerged. Understanding the preferences of the various groups of stakeholders makes it possible
to develop, use, and maintain effective and efficient performance measurement systems.
Performance measurement systems are not meant to be developed and to then sit in a
binder on a shelf as a type of trophy or status symbol. These systems should be developed so that
the execution of public policy through very specific mechanisms of departmentalization and
other forms of administrative processes, policies, and procedures can be accomplished. If done in
an effective and efficient way, these systems should both promote accountability and provide the
means for demonstrating that accountability when called upon to do so. By executing the study
reported in this dissertation, the researcher has attempted to bring some conceptual clarity to the
area of performance measurement systems.
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The researcher attempted to answer three research questions: What measures should be
included in the MBSC model? What are the stakeholders’ preferences for these measures? What
determines the preferences?
In order to answer the first research question, the general progression of previous
budgetary models used in the public sector was used to develop the Modified Balance Scorecard
(MBSC). Based on the BSC model, which is touted as being one of the most influential ideas of
the 20th century, this model has the potential to revolutionize current performance measurement
standards within the public sector. The MBSC is a model of five measurement perspectives that
integrates elements of previous budgetary models into an overall, comprehensive performance
measurement system. The five perspectives include the financial perspective, the client
perspective, the employee perspective, the internal management process perspective, and the
public good perspective. These perspectives were included in the model based on the results of
an analysis of the existing literature regarding performance measurement in the public sector.
More important than the practical contributions of this dissertation are the theoretical
contributions. Though there have been increasing demands for accountability within the public
sector, adequate methods of providing this information have not been developed. Simply using
models developed for the private sector is not sufficient. By nature, the public sector is different
from the private sector. There is a type of “fused” interest that exists within the public sector
that does not exist within the private sector, in that the taxpayers that ultimately fund the
operations of the public sector are also the recipients of the services (and some times goods)
provided by the public sector. Within the private sector, the owners of the company, or its
shareholders, provide the necessary funding for the operations of the organization while its
customers or clients receive the services or goods provided by the company. Though the
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shareholders and clients of a company can be one in the same, typically this is not the case. Due
to the existence of this distinctive characteristic, there is a definitely need for the development of
new performance measurement models or the adaptation of existing ones and the MBSC
provides a good base model that is flexible enough to be used for the further development of
future assessment models.
The second question was answered through quantitative analysis. Based on these results,
the researcher determined that clients mainly prefer financial, internal management process, and
public good measures, in that order. Alternatively, the managers prefer public good, internal
management process, and financial measures, in that order. Both groups tended to prefer
employee measures least.
The third question was also answered using quantitative analysis. The most significant
factors in influencing what determines the preferences of clients were experience, revenues,
competitiveness, and prime contracting. The only factor that was found to be significant in
influencing the performance measurement preferences of the managers was experience.
These factors and their resulting preferences can be used to design assessment
instruments that are customized for the appropriate stakeholder group. Consequently, the results
of this research are important in policy formulation and provide many implications regarding the
effective presentation of policies. These results can be used to help effectively craft policies so
that these policies can be presented appropriately to various groups. If executed correctly, this
should aid in presenting performance measurement systems in the most favorable light, thereby
maximizing acceptance in the utilization of these systems and accuracy in assessing the results of
implementing these systems.

142

Though the introduction of the Kaplan’s and Norton’s BSC in 1992 as an assessment tool
was phenomenally important in the area of performance measurement, this model needed to be
specifically adapted for the public sector. The four perspectives of the BSC presented a more
comprehensive assessment of performance than had previously been available for use within the
commercial sector; however, this model failed to adequately encompass the public sector values
that must be considered when measuring performance within that sector. By adding a fifth
perspective, the public good, the MBSC was devised for use within the public sector.

Implications and Recommendations

Policy Implications
This research was necessary because there is a lack of empirical research regarding the
identification and development of performance measures at the federal level, and this includes all
of the various stakeholder groups. Quality performance measurement systems are even more
necessary as increasing accountability remains the trend in government. Taxpayers of the United
States are becoming more sophisticated through better education and increased access to
information, thereby resulting in increasing demands for more accountability from those
responsible for running our federal government and from other elected officials.

Managerial Implications
From a practical point of view, these findings can be applied to the way policy is
presented to the various stakeholders. Based on these findings, when policies are being presented
to client groups, the policy should be presented by emphasizing points from the financial and
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internal management process perspectives. On the other hand, when policies are being present to
managers groups, the policy should be presented by emphasizing points from the public good
and internal management process perspectives.

Implications for Further Research
Many areas of research touched on in this dissertation can be further investigated. First,
manager and client preferences for performance measures could be researched at the state and
local levels. Second, differences between various client groups could be researched, such as
prime contractors vs. sub-contractors or small corporations vs. large corporations. One could also
look at minority owned versus non–minority owned businesses. Additionally, one could research
differences between federal employees and federal managers.
One could also alter the research design by changing the types of measures being
evaluated. For example, one could look at outcome vs. output measures within the same
measurement perspective. Finally, a fully developed model should be developed to better explain
stakeholders’ preferences with a probability sampling.
Another possibility for further research is investigating an agency that is more humanistic
or one that deals with more social issues, such as the agencies that provide health services. The
agency that was used in this dissertation is very technical and scientific in nature. Therefore, the
generalizability of the results is questionable.
Furthermore, multivariate analysis can and should be conducted. In order to strengthen
and verify the findings of the univariate and bivariate analysis, multivariate analysis can and
should be conducted. Once confirmed through further analysis, all results can be reported with
confidence and the generalizability of the findings can be incorrigibly established.
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In closing, performance measurement is vitally important, and its significance continues
to grow as accountability is emphasized more and more in government. High quality empirical
research remains necessary in the quest for ideal standards for assessing organizational
outcomes. Though performance measurement is dynamic and situational, continuous
improvement should always be the ultimate goal in the long and never-ending process of
developing and implementing adequate performance-measurement tools. By diligently pursuing
enhanced standards of accountability, public servants everywhere work together for the
betterment of the common good for stakeholders at every level, from the meekest citizen to the
highest elected official. It all falls together in working for the pursuit of a better democratic
society.
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CLIENT SURVEYS
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1. Please indicate your current position.
(1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____
(4) _____
(5) _____

Owner, CEO or President
Financial Manager or CFO
Operations Manager
Office Manager
Other

2. Which of the following classifications best describes your business?
(Check all that apply.)
(1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____
(4) _____
(5) _____

Small Business
Small Disadvantaged Business
8(a)
Woman Owned Business
HUBZone Small Business

3. Are you a “Top 100” contractor?
a. yes
b. no
4. How long has your business been in operation?
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Less than one year
1 – 2 years
3 – 4 years
4 – 5 years
6 – 7 years
8 – 9 years
more than 10 years

5. Has your business received any type of federally subsidized loan before?
(1) _____
(2) _____

Yes
No
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2. Please indicate the amount of revenues your business earned last year.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

less than $100,000
from $100,001 to $250,000
from $250,001 to $500,000
from $500,001 to $750,000
from $750,001 to $1,000,000
More than $1,000,000

7. Has your business ever been awarded a prime contract with a federal governmental agency?
(1) _____
(2) _____

Yes
No

8. If so, what type of contract was it? If not, go to question #8.
(1) supplies and equipment
(2) research and development
(3) technical services
(4) other services
9. Was it won competitively or through a set-aside program?
(1) competitive
(2) set aside
(3) I’ve won both types of contracts before
10. Has your business ever been awarded a sub-contract with a federal governmental agency?
(1) _____
(2) _____

Yes
No

11. Have you ever received training through an OSBDU program?
(1) _____
(2) _____

Yes
No

12. Have you ever been part of a teaming agreement?
(1) _____
(2) _____

Yes
No

13. Have you ever participated in the Mentor-Protégé Program?
(1)
Yes
(2)
No
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14. Are you ISO 9000 certified?
(1) _____
(2) _____

Yes
No

15. From my understanding, the mission of the OSDBU is to
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

_____ Find contracts or subcontracts for my business
_____ Help me write proposals to the government when bidding on contracts
_____ Introduce me to the appropriate contracting officer
_____ Provide sources of funds for my business
_____ Dissemination of information and exchange of ideas relative to the utilization of
small businesses

16. Below is a list of federal OSBDU performance measures. Please read this list and assess
how important they are to you in determining the organization’s level of achievement, using
the following scale.
Very important =4
Important =3
Somewhat important = 2
Not Important =1
Don’t know or can’t say =0
[ ] the number of clients that participate in the Mentor-Protégé Program
[ ] the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements
[ ] the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level
of service provided by the OSDBU
[ ] the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs
[ ] dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client
[ ] dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU
[ ] the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients
[ ] the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients
annually
[ ] percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their
performance appraisals
[ ] the number of employees that attend job related training workshops
[ ] the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or
higher
[ ] the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually
[ ] the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU
[ ] the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU
clients
[ ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become
certified
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[ ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a
contract
[ ] the percentage of citizens who are happy with the performance of the
OSDBU
[ ] the percentage of elected officials who are happy with the
performance of the OSDBU
[ ] the percentage of employees in other parts of NASA who are happy
with the performance of the OSDBU
[ ] the percentage of it SBA mandated goals achieved

17. Please indicate your age.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

less than 30 years old
31 to 39 years old
40 to 49 years old
50 to 59 years old
60 to 69 years old
70 to 79 years old
80 years old or older

18. Please indicate your gender.
_____ male
_____ female
_____ not sure
19. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have attained.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

less than a high school diploma or GED
High school diploma or GED
Some college
AA or AS (Two year) degree
BA or BS (Four year) degree
Some graduate education
Master’s degree
Doctoral degree
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1. Please indicate your current title.
(1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____
(4) _____
(5) _____

Director
Deputy Director
Women Business Rep
Veteran Business Rep
Other

2. How long have you worked in this position?
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Less than one year
1 – 2 years
3 – 4 years
4 – 5 years
6 – 7 years
8 – 9 years
more than 10 years

3. How long have you worked for your respective agency or department?
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Less than one year
1 – 2 years
3 – 4 years
4 – 5 years
6 – 7 years
8 – 9 years
more than 10 years

4. Have you ever worked for any other federal agencies? If no, go to question 6.
_____ yes
_____ no

5. Which other federal agency or agencies have you worked for?
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
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6. Please indicate the total number of years that you have worked for the federal
government.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Less than one year
1 – 3 years
3 – 5 years
6 – 10 years
11 – 15 years
16 - 20 years
more than 20 years

7. Please indicate the total dollar amount of contracts awarded to small
business by your respective agency last fiscal year.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

less than $1,000,000
from $1,000,001 to $2,500,000
from $2,500,001 to $5,000,000
from $5,000,001 to $7,500,000
from $7,500,001 to $10,000,000
More than $10,000,000

8. In my perception, most OSDBU customers feel that the OSDBU mission is to:
(6) _____ Find contracts or subcontracts for their businesses
(7) _____ Help them write proposals when bidding on contracts
(8) _____ Introduce them to the appropriate contracting officers so that their bids will be
exposed to the right person
(9) _____ Provide sources of funds for their business
(10)
_____ Disseminate information and exchange ideas relative to how their
businesses can be fully utilized in support of your agency’s or department’s mission
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9. Below is a list of federal OSBDU performance measures. Please read this list and assess
how important you feel each measure is in determining the organization’s level of
achievement and success. Use the following scale.
Very important =4
Important =3
Somewhat important = 2
Not Important =1
Don’t know or can’t say =0
[ ] the number of clients that participate in the Mentor-Protégé Program
[ ] the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements
[ ] the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level of
service provided by the OSDBU
[ ] the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs
[ ] dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client
[ ] dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU
[ ] the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients
[ ] the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients
annually
[ ] percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their performance
appraisals
[ ] the number of employees that attend job related training workshops
[ ] the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or higher
[ ] the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually
[ ] the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU
[ ] the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU
clients
[ ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become certified
[ ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a
contract
[ ] the percentage of citizens who are happy with the OSDBU’s performance
[ ] the percentage of elected officials who are happy with the OSDBU’s
performance
[ ] the percentage of employees in other parts of the federal agency who are
happy with the performance of the OSDBU
[ ] the percentage of its SBA mandated goals achieved
10. Please indicate your gender.
_____ male
_____ female
_____ not sure
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11. Please indicate your age.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

less than 30 years old
31 to 39 years old
40 to 49 years old
50 to 59 years old
60 to 69 years old
70 to 79 years old
80 years old or older

12. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have attained.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

less than a high school diploma or GED
High school diploma or GED
Some college
AA or AS (Two year) degree
BA or BS (Four year) degree
Some graduate education
Master’s degree
Doctoral degree

13. Have you ever owned your own business?
_____ yes
_____ no
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